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ABSTRACT
The 2009 United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen
has been widely viewed as a failure—a referendum in the eyes of
many on the top-down, comprehensive approach to climate
governance embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and carried forward in
efforts to negotiate a successor regime.
Despite a modest
agreement on future work toward a new agreement, the most
recent climate meeting in Cancún Mexico reinforces this view,
underscoring the conclusion that Copenhagen represents an
important inflection point for international climate policy.
Although much of the post-Copenhagen commentary has correctly
identified various problems, even fatal flaws, with the process,
very little has been particularly helpful in marking out a
constructive way forward. This Article takes some steps in that
direction, offering a partial re-conceptualization of the nature and
possibilities of global climate governance in the post-Copenhagen
era. It starts from the premise that any realistic approach to
climate governance must begin with the facts of globalization, legal
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pluralism, and fragmentation rather than the view that climate
change is a particular kind of global problem that can only be
solved through a top-down, supra-national regime aimed at
managing the Earth system. As argued here, this “Earth systems
governance” approach to the climate change problem, which
derives from radically enhanced scientific and technical ways of
understanding global environmental change and a particularly
narrow view of collective action, has become deeply embedded as
a basic objective of climate policy. The resulting logic of global
environmental managerialism, however, is very much at odds with
the plural, fragmented nature of the international legal and
political order—a fact well illustrated by the limited results coming
out of the recent climate meetings in Copenhagen and Cancún as
well as the near total disarray that marks the current climate policy
discourse in the United States and other major emitting countries.
In contrast, an alternative, post-Copenhagen approach to the
problem of climate governance that starts with the facts of
globalization and its implications for law and legal order trains
attention to new and different, and much messier, ways of
coordinating efforts across jurisdictions and building enabling
environments for collective action. This Article maps several key
elements of post-Copenhagen climate governance through an
analysis of efforts to bring reduced emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation (“REDD”) into climate policy. Although
deforestation, nearly all of which occurs in the tropics, accounts for
some fifteen percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, it has only
recently become a major focus of climate policy, emerging as one of
the few areas of consensus in the international climate
negotiations. As a new paradigm for land use that implicates
multiple legal and institutional orders at multiple levels, the REDD
experience illustrates both the opportunities and the challenges of
constructing climate governance through the complex articulation
between distinctively global projects and particular national and
sub-national institutions. Approaching climate governance from
this perspective provides a basis for some more general claims
regarding the possibilities of global environmental law in the
context of a plural, fragmented international legal order.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article starts from the premise that climate change is not
simply another environmental problem, but rather “a key site in
the global transformation of world order.” 1 By now, of course, the
scale, scope, and potential severity of global climate change have
been well documented. Expected impacts such as sea-level rise, 2
melting ice sheets, 3 receding glaciers, 4 altered precipitation
1F

2F

3F

4F

1 Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards, Introduction: The Globalization of Climate
Science and Climate Politics, in CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 3 (Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards eds., 2001).
2 See Gerald A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Projections, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 747, 820–22 (Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing projections regarding
sea-level rise).
3 See Peter Lemke et al., Observations: Changes in Snow, Ice and Frozen Ground,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 337, 361–69 (reviewing evidence regarding ice
sheet mass loss in Greenland and Antarctica); Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 816–20
(reviewing projections regarding ice sheet loss in the twenty-first century).
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patterns, 5 increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes, 6
drought, 7 new and amplified disease vectors, 8 ocean acidification, 9
species loss, 10 and all manner of social and economic
consequences 11 have been discussed extensively in the relevant
literatures. So too the unique governance challenges presented by
the problem of climate change—the long atmospheric residence
times of greenhouse gases and the essentially “irreversible”
warming effects of such gases, 12 the inertia of a global energy
5F

6F

7F

8F

9F

10F

1F

12F

4 See Lemke et al., supra note 3, at 356–60 (reviewing evidence regarding
glacier and ice cap loss); Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 814–16 (reviewing
projections regarding glacier and ice cap loss).
5 See Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 768–70, 782, 784 (discussing climate model
projections of precipitation extremes).
6 See id. at 786, 788–89 (discussing climate model projections of tropical
cyclones and extra-tropical storms).
7 See id. at 768–70, 782 (discussing climate model projections of increased risk
of drought in certain areas).
8 See Ulisses Confalonieri et al., Human Health, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 391, 407–12 (Parry et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing “projections of climatechange-related health impacts”).
9 See Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 793 (discussing ocean acidification resulting
from increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide).
10 See Andreas Fischlin et al., Ecosystems, Their Properties, Goods and Services, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION
OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 211, 239–45
(discussing projections regarding biodiversity impacts of climate change).
11 See Tom Wilbanks et al., Industry, Settlement and Society, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 357, 364–77 (reviewing wide range of
projected social and environmental impacts of climate change).
12 See David Archer & Victor Brovkin, The Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of
Anthropogenic CO2, 90 CLIMATIC CHANGE 283, 294 (2008) (“[T]he substantial
fraction of projected CO2 emissions will stay in the atmosphere for millennia, and
a part of fossil fuel CO2 will remain in the atmosphere for many thousands of
years.”). Susan Solomon and her co-authors elaborate on the “irreversible” effects
of carbon dioxide emissions:

It is not generally appreciated that the atmospheric temperature
increases caused by rising carbon dioxide concentrations are not
expected to decrease significantly even if carbon emissions were to
completely cease. Future carbon dioxide emissions in the 21st century
will hence lead to adverse climate changes on both short and long time
scales that would be essentially irreversible []where irreversible is
defined here as a time scale exceeding the end of the millennium in the
year 3000 . . . .
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system marked by trillions of dollars in fixed capital with very long
turnover times, 13 deeply entrenched patterns of land use, 14 the
generation-scale time lags separating the costs of mitigation from
any benefits, 15 the uncertainties with respect to responses and
feedbacks of dynamic systems, 16 the radically uneven and unequal
challenges associated with adaptation needs and capabilities 17—a
“super wicked problem” if ever there was one. 18 Indeed, when
viewed as a mitigation challenge, any serious attempt to solve the
13F

14F

15F

16F

17F

18F

Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions,
106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) (internal references omitted); see also
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., CLIMATE STABILIZATION
TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 6
(2010) (”[C]ertain levels of warming associated with carbon dioxide emission
could lock the Earth and many future generations of humans into very large
impacts . . . .”).
13 See John P. Holdren, The Energy Innovation Imperative: Addressing Oil
Dependence, Climate Change, and Other 21st Century Energy Challenges, 1
INNOVATIONS TECH. GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 3, 6 (2006) (“The replacement
cost of today’s global energy-supply system . . . is in the range of $12 trillion, and
this immense capital investment turns over with a characteristic time of 30–40
years, the average operating lifetime of the facilities involved.”).
14 See Gert Jan Nabuurs et al., Forestry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 541, 546–47 (Metz et al. eds.,
2007) (discussing forest sector emissions and removals); Pete Smith et al.,
Agriculture, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra at 497, 503–05 (discussing regional and global trends in
emissions from agricultural practices).
15 See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 49 (2010) (noting that “the costs of mitigation policies are
borne immediately, and the possibly large benefits of such policies (avoided
damages) are enjoyed far in the future”).
16 See Kenneth L. Denman et al., Couplings Between Changes in the Climate
System and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 499, 526–33
(discussing terrestrial and ocean carbon cycle processes and feedbacks to climate).
17 See W. Neil Adger et al., Assessment of Adaptation Practices, Options,
Constraints and Capacity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at
717, 733–37 (discussing “limits and barriers to adaptation”); Kirstin Dow et al.,
Exploring the Social Justice Implications of Adaptation and Vulnerability, in FAIRNESS IN
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 79, 79–96 (W. Neil Adger et al. eds., 2006)
(outlining asymmetries in worldwide adaptive capacities).
18 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009)
(discussing the “super-wicked” nature of the climate change problem).
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climate change problem entails nothing short of a full-scale
reorganization of the fossil energy system that currently provides
more than 80% of world energy 19 and fundamental changes in
global land-use patterns. 20 Viewed as an adaptation challenge (and
it is clear that such a view must proceed in tandem with
mitigation), climate change goes to the very core of structural
vulnerabilities in the world system, the resilience and adaptive
capacity of social and ecological systems, the obligations of the rich
to the poor, the prospect of seemingly permanent states of
emergency. More recent proposals entertaining the possibility of
planetary-scale geoengineering to manage the Earth’s radiation
balance and the global carbon cycle entail a degree of intentional
human intervention in the Earth system that would be truly
unprecedented. 21
The rapidly growing body of legal scholarship on climate
change addresses many of these issues, focusing on questions of
instrument choice, institutional design, federalism, the rights and
obligations of various actors, the challenges of adaptation, and the
implications for administrative law (to name a few). 22 Not
19F

20F

21F

2F

19 See BRITISH PETROLEUM, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 41 (2010)
(reporting world energy consumption by fuel, with fossil fuels accounting for
approximately 88% of total world energy consumption).
20 See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 14, at
25, 29 (identifying sectoral contributions to GHG emissions with forestry (17.4%)
and agriculture (13.5%) accounting for more than 30% of the total).
21 See generally THE ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE,
GOVERNANCE, AND UNCERTAINTY (2009) (discussing geoengineering techniques
and related governance issues); David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A
Last Resort Against Global Warming?, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 64, 64–72 (2009) (evaluating
geoengineering proposals).
22 See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change:
Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009)
(discussing the challenge of uncertainty regarding the effects of climate change for
natural resource governance); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate
Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (exploring interplay between state and
federal responses to climate change); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—
Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34
HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 9 (2010) (proposing a “principled flexibility” approach to
climate change in order to adapt to changing environmental conditions); Daniel
A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879
(2008) (discussing the relationship between federal and state responses to climate
change); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo L.J. 1565
(2008) (positing that the United States’ role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions
should be independent from notions of corrective or distributive justice); Jedediah
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surprisingly, and with good reason, much of the existing literature
has approached the problem in the context of traditional
understandings of environmental law, often with a domestic focus,
but usually with a recognition that such understandings do not
suffice in terms of the response options that are needed to
comprehend, much less govern, such a daunting set of challenges.
Everyone, it seems, recognizes the mismatch between the scale of
the problem and existing legal and governance capabilities,
manifest in the notable absence of any global law-making body or
world environmental authority capable of stepping in to steer the
world community toward a solution. 23 Likewise, the fragmented
nature of the various institutions and regulatory authorities that
would need to be engaged in any comprehensive approach to
global climate change, not to mention the deep political divisions
between nations, is readily apparent to even the most casual
observer. The radically incomplete effort by the parties to the
international climate regime to forge a comprehensive legal
instrument for the post-2012 period bears witness to these
difficulties. 24 So too does the difficulty of enacting domestic
23F

24F

Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy,
119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010) (contextualizing approaches to climate change within a
discussion of American environmental and political history); J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 65 (2010) (investigating
challenges facing administrative agencies charged with responding to complex
environmental problems such as climate change); Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs
of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293 (2010)
(evaluating alternative proposals to assign responsibility for reducing greenhouse
gases and advocating on behalf of a per-capita approach); Katherine A. Trisolini,
All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate
Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010) (arguing that local governments
have an important role to play in responding to climate change); Jonathan B.
Weiner, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law,
17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210 (2008) (discussing political logjam facing climate
legislation in the U.S.).
23 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1160–61 (“Climate Change is ultimately a
global problem. But there is an absence of any global lawmaking institution with
a jurisdictional reach and legal authority that match the scope of the problem.”).
24 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. of
the Conf. of the Parties on its 15th Sess., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord,
Decision 2/CP.15, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010)
[hereinafter Copenhagen Accord]; William D. Nordhaus, Economic Aspects of Global
Warming in a Post-Copenhagen Environment, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11721
(2010) (concluding that the actions contemplated by the Copenhagen Accord, even
if carried out in full, would not be sufficient to meet prudent stabilization
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climate change legislation in the United States and other major
emitting countries. 25
In sum, there is on the one hand clear recognition that the
incredibly complex, multidimensional problem of climate change
demands a comprehensive global solution; while on the other hand
it is all too apparent that the existing international legal and
political order is not up to the task. The “perils of global
legalism”—to use Eric Posner’s phrase—serves as an apt
description of both the limited efficacy of international law and the
problems that ensue from an exaggerated faith in the ability of the
current international legal system to solve this massive collective
action problem. 26 The recent Copenhagen Accord, and now the
Cancún Agreement, provide unambiguous confirmation that the
existing United Nations process is limited, at best, and unlikely to
be a major driver of climate governance in the coming years. 27
Once all the rage, Multilateral Environmental Agreements now
seem to be limping along as hollow reminders of a more optimistic
time when coherent global environmental governance seemed
within reach. 28 Where, then, does this leave us? Where do we go
after Copenhagen?
25F

26F

27F

28F

targets). The recently completed Cancún Agreement, which narrowly averted a
complete breakdown of the U.N. climate process, represents a very modest step to
enshrine and elaborate on some of the pledges embodied in the Copenhagen
Accord and keeps the process alive for at least another year. See UNFCCC,
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative
Action under the Convention, Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2010, Cancún Draft Decision
-/CP.16, Advanced Unedited Version (Dec. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Cancún
Agreement].
25 The difficulties of enacting domestic climate legislation in the United States
and other countries have been very apparent in recent months. See, e.g., Carl
Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us
/politics/23cong.html (“The effort to advance a major climate change bill through
the Senate this summer collapsed . . . .”); Australia Shelves Key Emissions Trading
Scheme, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8645767.stm
(“The Australian government has put plans for a flagship emissions scheme on
hold until 2013 at the earliest.”).
26 See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 7–8 (2009) (discussing
difficulties of solving global collective action problems such as climate change in
the absence of world government, and criticizing “global legalism” as a naïve
faith in the ability of “law without government” to solve such problems).
27 See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24; Cancún Agreement, supra note 24.
28 This is not to say that Multilateral Environmental Agreements are
somehow unimportant or wholly without success. Witness the effectiveness of
the Montreal Protocol in stemming the destruction of the stratospheric ozone
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This Article offers some provisional answers to these questions,
proposing a partial re-conceptualization of the nature and
possibilities of climate governance in the post-Copenhagen era.
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, our extraordinary
ability to see and understand global environmental problems such
as climate change has facilitated an unrealistic view that the path to
solving such problems must lead to global institutions capable of
governing the Earth system in a comprehensive manner. Put
another way, our unprecedented ability to see environmental
problems as global problems has instilled an unrealistic penchant
for globalism in environmental law and governance. 29 When
combined with the seemingly ubiquitous logic of technocratic
managerialism that drives dominant approaches to contemporary
environmental regulation, 30 this way of seeing has underwritten a
series of attempts within the field of international environmental
law and diplomacy to construct top-down, supra-national
architectures that are deeply at odds with the contemporary
international legal and political order. 31
Second, if we look at how globalization is actually proceeding
and what scholars of globalization outside of the environmental
field are telling us; that is, if we accept as fact the fragmented,
plural nature of the international legal and political order, we must
look to new and different (and much messier) architectures for
coordinating efforts across different jurisdictions. 32 In doing so, we
29F

30F

31F

32F

layer. See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 95–96 (2004) (reviewing the performance of major
international environmental agreements).
29 See Clark A. Miller, Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and
Global Governance, 20 GOVERNANCE 325, 339 (2007) (describing globalism as “the
explicit framing of policy issues as being capable of identification, analysis, and
management on scales no smaller than the planet as a whole”); see also Elinor
Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 3–4 (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009) (arguing against waiting for a
single global solution to the climate change problem).
30 See
generally DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010) (critiquing the role of
technocratic knowledge practices such as risk-assessment and cost-benefit
analysis as dominant ways of thinking in contemporary environmental law).
31 The Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the most obvious example. Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997,
2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; see discussion infra Section 1.
32 According to Paul Berman,
THE

[a]s a descriptive matter, pluralists argue that legal fragmentation and
the contest among plural sources of norms are not realities that a
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need to move away from the simplified notion of the state as a
unitary actor with its international analogue of consent-based
treaty regimes; away from “a policy instrument theory of state
capacity” 33 with its international analogues of instrument choice
and regime architectures toward a more nuanced appreciation for
the ways in which global projects are made, inserted into, and
reworked through a complex mix of national and sub-national
institutions.
All of which makes the task of trying to understand the current
conjuncture exceedingly difficult, ensuring that any effort to reconceptualize climate governance in the post-Copenhagen period
is necessarily provisional. That said, and this is the third step in
the argument, it is clear that we need a fresh vocabulary, an
expanded set of concepts, alternative ways of framing the
challenges, but more importantly, new ways of understanding the
conditions of possibility for climate governance that build upon
past efforts without sliding back into the worn grooves of prior
thinking. To be sure, a number of commentators have bemoaned
the problems inherent in the way that international environmental
law has heretofore approached climate change and have suggested
alternative approaches to the problem—trade; technology;
3F

hierarchically situated actor can choose to permit or reject; pluralism is
simply a fact because multiple communities assert norms that have
impacts . . . . Accordingly, instead of bemoaning either the fragmentation
of law or the messiness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should accept them
as necessary consequences of the fact that communities can be neither
homogenized into a single universal collective nor hermetically sealed
off from one another. More normatively, we can go further and consider
the possibility that this jurisdictional messiness may, in the end, provide
important systemic benefits by fostering dialogue among multiple
constituencies, authorities, levels of government, and nonstate
communities.
Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism: Defining the Field, 5 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 225, 238 (2009). But see David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many
Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 641, 641 (2007) (“Legal pluralism is not a fact about the world.
It is a professional experience: the experience that things don’t add up, that
coherence fails, that incommensurability must be acknowledged.”).
Whether fact or experience—and it is not clear why the experience of legal
pluralism is not itself a fact about the world—the proliferation of legal and
normative orders is something that lawyers and legal scholars must confront
in any serious engagement with globalization.
33 SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES 227 (2006).
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development; security; etc. 34—all of which have their respective
merits, lending further support to the observation that this is a
problem that cuts across many domains and one that deeply
implicates, and thus cannot escape, the basic facts of pluralism and
fragmentation.
But any re-conceptualization true to its charge needs at least to
attempt a rethinking of basic concepts and approaches.
Accordingly, instead of starting with the usual suspects of actors,
interests, and institutions; principles and norms; levels of
governance; instruments and implementation—all basic concepts
deployed by leading analytical perspectives on international
environmental law 35 and all very important in their own right in
understanding the landscape of climate governance—the reconceptualization advanced here (partial as it is) begins with the
view that climate governance, in its emerging manifestations,
operates through a constellation of global forms or projects that
have a distinctive capacity for de-contextualization and mobility
(think, for example, of specific policy instruments such as cap-andtrade, new forms of property such as emissions allowances and
offset credits, certain principles and norms, standards regimes for
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reporting and accounting, or widely
accepted social and environmental safeguards) that are being
34F

35F

See, e.g., Scott Barrett, A Multitrack Climate Treaty System, in ARCHITECTURES
AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD
237 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) (proposing a new
“architecture” for climate policy that begins with the objective of sustainable
development); David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations,
in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE
POST-KYOTO WORLD 150–51 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007)
(“Conceptualizing the climate change issue as one of economic cooperation might
help to mobilize attention to better precedents.”); Jon Barnett, Security and Climate
Change, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2003) (exploring climate change as a security
issue).
35 See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 108–35 (2010) (describing key actors and their interests and
roles in international environmental law); PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2nd ed., 2003) (discussing key principles
and norms of various substantive areas of international environmental law);
Jeffrey L. Dunhoff, Levels of Environmental Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 86 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing “allocation of authority over environmental issues among different
levels of governance”); Richard B. Stewart, Instrument Choice, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 148 (Daniel Bodansky et al.
eds., 2007) (examining various environmental regulatory instruments and their
role in international environmental law).
34

FOR

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

BOYD.DOC

468

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:2

assimilated and worked out in particular national and sub-national
circumstances. 36 Put more abstractly, this Article contends that in
order to understand the nature and possibilities of climate
governance in the Post-Copenhagen context, we need to look at
how certain forms and techniques of globalization—instruments,
ideologies, calculative rationalities, expert systems, networks,
legalisms of various kinds—are materialized through the “thick
environments” of national and sub-national institutions and what
this entails for efforts to coordinate efforts across various
jurisdictions. 37 The metaphor that best captures this is not that of a
“download” from higher levels of governance to lower, or that of a
“transplant” from one legal system to another (though both are
important), but rather that of an “assemblage” of various global
forms and projects on the one hand and their instantiations in the
partial, situated, contingent settings of national and sub-national
institutions on the other. 38
36F

37F

38F

This characterization borrows from the notion of “global forms” advanced
by Stephen Collier and Aihwa Ong:
36

Global phenomena . . . have a distinctive capacity for decontextualization
and recontextualization, abstractability and movement, across diverse
social and cultural situations and spheres of life. Global forms are able to
assimilate themselves to new environments, to code heterogeneous
contexts and objects in terms that are amenable to control and valuation.
Stephen J. Collier & Aihwa Ong, Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems, in
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PROBLEMS 11 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005).
37 See SASSEN, supra note 33, at 227 (advocating for research on the ways that
“global systems insert themselves in national domains where they were once
nonexistent. The outcome of this negotiation between standardizing global
systems and the thick environments of the national can easily be packaged as
national even though its actual content pertains to new global systems.”). This
conceptualization bears some similarity to Sally Engle Merry’s research on the
“vernacularization” of international human rights ideas or norms in particular,
local circumstances. See Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local
Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 44–49 (2006)
(“Vernacularization falls along a continuum depending on how extensively local
cultural forms and practices are incorporated into imported institutions.”).
38 Although the concept of assemblage has a rich theoretical provenance, it is
used here primarily as a descriptive term that provides an alternative to an
exclusive focus on levels or scales of governance in order to highlight the
emergent, contingent combinations of people, practices, technologies, and
rationalities in particular domains. See SASSEN, supra note 33, at 5 n.1 (2006)
(discussing theoretical understandings of the concept of assemblage, while
arguing for a simple, descriptive use of the term that captures different
combinations of territory, authority, and rights in the context of her inquiry into
globalization). Aihwa Ong describes the “space of analysis” that is captured by
the concept of global assemblage as one that “bypasses structural analysis, scalar
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From a normative standpoint, such a perspective departs from,
but need not be inconsistent with, the dominant approach to
climate governance, with its progression from global atmospheric
stabilization targets to emissions pathways, national commitments,
policy instruments, and implementation.
Godspeed if that
approach can be made to work, and this Article certainly does not
advocate the abandonment of ongoing efforts to negotiate an
effective post-2012 climate treaty. But in the meantime and in light
of the considerable difficulties confronting the U.N. process (not to
mention the U.S. Congress), it is critical to recognize and build
upon the great deal of ongoing climate governance activities
happening in many diverse places around the world and at
multiple levels (including the U.N. process). All of which is messy,
incoherent, highly politicized, and wrapped into larger strategic
concerns. But this is where we are, and rather than wait for some
transformative moment in the international negotiations or, even
more ambitious, some new ecological awakening, it would seem
prudent to explore novel ways to build on what is actually
happening without retreating into localism and without abdicating
to a crude realism that simply accepts the contemporary
geopolitical order. Triage perhaps, but a triage that does not have
to be fatalistic in the face of daily reminders that the prospects of
hitting stabilization targets are slipping away.
Analytically, such an approach directs attention away from a
focus on climate governance as a singular enterprise toward a
more empirically grounded exploration of how particular states
and state capacities are being mobilized to support and facilitate
different global projects directed at various aspects of the climate
change problem; the manner in which laws, customs and
normative orders of various kinds in various places are being

progressionism and predetermined outcomes commonly deployed by political
economy.” Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as a Mobile Technology, 32 TRANS. INST. BRIT.
GEOGRAPHERS 3, 5 (2007). Elaborating further on the concept, Collier & Ong note
that
[a]n assemblage is the product of multiple determinations that are not
reducible to a single logic. The temporality of an assemblage is
emergent. It does not always involve new forms, but forms that are
shifting, in formation, or at stake. As a composite concept, the term
”global assemblage” suggests inherent tensions: global implies broadly
encompassing, seamless, and mobile; assemblage implies hetereogenous,
contingent, unstable, partial, and situated.
Collier & Ong, supra note 36, at 12.
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pushed and pulled into such efforts; the infrastructural conditions
and knowledge practices that allow global projects to take shape
and circulate; the possibilities for advancing stakeholder
participation and accountability in the absence of traditional
democratic institutions; and the implications of new value forms
for property, territory, and control over resources. One important
goal of such an inquiry is to provide additional analytical content
to the notion of an emerging “global environmental law” by
exploring how states, markets, laws, and other institutions come to
cohere within nested, polycentric forms of governance. 39 Another
is to suggest some elements of an agenda for further research that
is sensitive to the partial, uneven, and contingent natures of
climate governance in the post-Copenhagen era.
These arguments are elaborated through an analysis of efforts
to bring reduced emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (“REDD”) into climate policy. 40 Deforestation, nearly
all of which occurs in the tropics, accounts for some 15% of global
anthropogenic
CO2
emissions—more
than
the
global
transportation sector and roughly comparable to 2005 CO2
emissions from the United States or China. 41 And yet, despite this
39F

40F

41F

39 See generally Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global
Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009) (discussing concept of global
environmental law); see also infra Section 2.
40 See infra Section 3; William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How
Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 872–77
(2010) (providing background on REDD).
41 See G.R. van der Werf et al., CO2 Emissions from Forest Loss, 2 NATURE
GEOSCIENCE 737, 738 (2009) (estimating contribution of emissions from
deforestation, forest degradation, and destruction of peatlands at about 15% of
total anthropogenic CO2 emissions). Earlier estimates for the 1990s put emissions
from deforestation at some 20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. See
Raymond E. Gullison et al., Tropical Forests and Climate Policy, 316 SCI. 985, 985
(2007) (noting that “[t]ropical deforestation released ~1.5 billion metric tons of
carbon to the atmosphere annually throughout the 1990s, accounting for almost
20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions”); Nabuurs et al., supra note 14,
at 543 (reporting that emissions from deforestation in the 1990s were 5.8 billion
metric tons (5.8 Gigatonnes or Gt) of CO2 per year, which is approximately 1.6 Gt
of carbon per year); see also Corinne Le Quéré et al., Trends in the Sources and Sinks
of Carbon Dioxide, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 831, 832 (2009) (“The relative contribution
of LUC [Land Use Change] CO2 emissions to total anthropogenic CO2 emissions
decreased from 20% in 1990–2000 to 12% in 2008, owing to increasing fossil fuel
emissions and below-average deforestation emissions in 2008.”).
For a
comparison of emissions from deforestation with those from the transportation
sector, see Hans-Holger Rogner et al., Introduction to CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
MITIGATION. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 99, 105 fig.1.3b,
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substantial contribution to the climate change problem, emissions
from tropical deforestation were expressly excluded from the
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008–2012), 42 creating
an immense gap in international climate policy. Since the mid2000s, however, there has been a clear shift in favor of including
deforestation in climate policy at multiple levels. 43 Widely viewed
as one of the few bright spots in the recent international climate
negotiations, REDD represents an effort to mobilize the protection
of tropical forests in various countries as part of a coordinated
scheme aimed at valorizing the carbon embodied in standing
tropical forests and translating this into compliance-grade
emissions reductions that can be recognized in various pay-forperformance schemes. As such, REDD is an enormously ambitious
and challenging endeavor (nothing short of a new paradigm for
tropical land use) that is fraught with difficulty and that could
easily fall apart. It also represents what is likely the last best
chance to save tropical forests at scale.
Building on a previous article that explored the scientific,
technical, and legal practices involved in making deforestation an
object of climate governance, 44 this Article uses the REDD case to
illustrate how an incipient global project is being inserted into and
worked out through particular national and sub-national efforts to
govern forests and land use, measure and monetize carbon, and
link rural actors and local communities into a new development
model that is tied to emerging GHG compliance systems. As a
nascent form of climate governance, REDD puts considerable
pressure on traditional legal conceptions of tropical forests as
sovereign national resources, and has potentially far-reaching
implications for existing structures of forest governance and land
42F

43F

4F

which shows agricultural emissions at 13.5%, forestry emissions at 17.4%, energy
supply emissions at 25.9%, and transportation emissions at 13.1% of global GHG
emissions in 2004). CO2 emissions in the United States for 2005 were 5.8 Gt/year.
Chinese emissions for the same year were 5.1 GtCO2/yr. See INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007: CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS 199 (2007)
(comparing the emissions of China and India with other regions of the world).
42 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. on
its 7th Sess., Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Decision 11/CP.7: Land Use, Land-Use Change,
and Forestry, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 60 (Jan. 21, 2002) (excluding
avoided deforestation activities from the Clean Development Mechanism); see also
Boyd, supra note 40, at 869–71 (discussing reasons why tropical deforestation was
excluded from the Kyoto Protocol).
43 See discussion infra Section 3.2.
44 See Boyd, supra note 40.
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use. In keeping with the approach advanced in this Article, REDD
can thus be seen as a global project that is taking shape in faraway
places—an emergent assemblage, a mash up, a trading zone where
decisions taken in international climate negotiations, the design of
GHG compliance systems, high-tech forest monitoring capabilities,
and the heady prospects of international carbon finance mix with
the contingent and uneven realities of national administrative
capacities and laws, state and local practices of forest governance,
and a multitude of stakeholders and forest-dependent peoples.
One of the lessons that emerges from the case study is that if
REDD is ever going to work—that is, if REDD is ever going to
succeed in building durable and equitable practices of sustainable
forest governance capable of protecting standing tropical forests
over very long time periods across different jurisdictions—it will
only happen if the resulting assemblage builds upon the
vernacular institutions and informal processes that are necessary to
sustain any attempt at forging a new formal order of land use. 45
Conversely, if REDD is pursued in a strictly top-down manner that
ignores, or even seeks to erase, the rights, interests, and customary
practices of local forest-dependent communities, it will surely fail
like so many other past schemes to improve the human
condition. 46 The result of such failure, of course, would almost
certainly mean a continuation of business-as-usual, which will
inevitably lead to the ongoing destruction of the world’s remaining
tropical forests as global pressures on land use intensify. Given the
considerable momentum currently behind REDD and the lack of
any viable alternatives to protect tropical forests at scale, it is
critical, therefore, to make a run at getting it right. Doing so, this
Article contends, requires understanding not only how this
particular form of climate governance is being assembled in
various circumstances, but also the key elements of an enabling
45F

46F

See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 310 (1998) (“Formal order, to be more
explicit, is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal
processes, which the formal scheme does not recognize, without which it could
not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain.”).
46 See id. (describing various failed schemes to improve the human
condition); see also TANIA MURRAY LI, THE WILL TO IMPROVE: GOVERNMENTALITY,
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE PRACTICE OF POLITICS 4–6 (2007) (describing experiences
with various “improvement schemes” in Indonesia and analyzing such schemes
as a distinct governmental rationality).
45

THE
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environment for how it might work, and a sober assessment of
what is gained and what is lost in the process.
The Article proceeds as follows: the next Section traces the
manner in which new ways of seeing associated with the emerging
program of Earth systems science during the post-World War II
period have facilitated a view of the Earth system as a unitary
governable domain, with important implications for how
environmental law thinks about global environmental problems
such as climate change. Section 2 then applies some of the insights
from research on law and globalization to the project of global
environmental law, with specific attention to the role of the state
and the implications of pluralism and fragmentation for efforts to
develop effective forms of climate governance. Section 3 explores
in detail the case of REDD as an emerging form of climate
governance, illustrating how REDD has come to be constituted as a
global project of potentially immense reach, the manner in which it
is taking shape in faraway places all over the world, the resulting
changes in forest law and governance, and the ways in which new
forms of value, driven by emerging GHG compliance systems, are
reshaping the relationship of the state to the forest and to local
communities and forest-dependent people. The Article concludes
with some general claims regarding the nature and possibilities of
post-Copenhagen climate governance.
2.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PROJECT OF EARTH SYSTEMS
GOVERNANCE

Contemporary understandings of global climate change derive
from decades of scientific, technical, and institutional investments
in new, comprehensive ways of seeing the Earth as an integrated
system and an ability to monitor and assess ecological disruptions
that are increasingly global in scale. 47 This distinctive set of
knowledge
practices—a
new
epistemology
of
global
environmental change—has profoundly influenced basic
understandings of and approaches to environmental governance. 48
47F

48F

47 See generally PAUL N. EDWARDS, A VAST MACHINE: COMPUTER MODELS,
CLIMATE DATA, AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2010) (tracing the history
of how the global climate system became a coherent object of knowledge).
48 See William C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion and Climate Change:
An Historical Overview, in THE SOCIAL LEARNING GROUP, LEARNING TO MANAGE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO
CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 22–27 (2001) (discussing the
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Indeed, the idea that the Earth system can be approached as an
object of governance has come to operate as a powerful
background norm for much of international environmental law
and, specifically, climate change law and policy. As such, it has
important, though often unrecognized, implications for how we
think about the prospects for global environmental governance.
This Section explores these unrecognized implications, arguing
that the dominant approach to climate governance embodied in the
Kyoto Protocol and in much of the ongoing discussion regarding a
post-2012 climate treaty suffers from an unrealistic embrace of
global, dirigiste solutions that has blinded international climate
policy to the possibilities of varied solutions that come with partial,
nested forms of climate governance.
2.1. Ways of Seeing and the Climate Problem
The idea that human societies are capable of acting as agents of
environmental change on a global scale has existed since at least the
late nineteenth century, 49 but it is only within the last century and,
more fundamentally, in the last several decades, that we have
developed systematic ways of seeing and understanding the
myriad and growing human impacts on the global environment. 50
While the full history of this new way of seeing has yet to be
written, many of the key developments that underwrote it are
relatively easy to recognize. Early conceptual foundations were
49F

50F

historical development of Earth systems science and understandings of human
impacts on the global environment).
49 See GEORGE P. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE, at iii (David Lowenthal ed., 1965)
(1864) (“The object of the present volume is: to indicate the character and,
approximately, the extent of the changes produced by human action in the
physical conditions of the globe we inhabit . . . .”); see also CLARENCE GLACKEN,
TRACES ON THE RHODIAN SHORE 704 (1967) (concluding that recognition of the
“philosophic importance” of “man as a modifier of nature” did not happen until
later in the nineteenth century); Mike Hulme et al., Unstable Climates: Exploring the
Statistical and Social Constructions of ‘Normal’ Climate, 40 GEOFORUM 197, 198 (2009)
(discussing the role of standardized instruments, formal statistical rules, and
particular knowledge practices of meteorologists and climatologists in the
nineteenth century that “turned the idea of climate into something that could be
measured and quantified”).
50 See Paul N. Edwards, The World in a Machine: Origins and Impacts of Early
Computerized Global Systems Models, in SYSTEMS, EXPERTS AND COMPUTERS: THE
SYSTEMS APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD WAR II AND AFTER
221 (Agatha C. Hughes & Thomas P. Hughes eds., 2000) (noting that “grounded
empirical knowledge of geophysical features and processes remained in a
rudimentary state until the Second World War”).
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laid in the 1920s by Russian geochemist Wassily Vernadsky who,
drawing on previous work by Theodore Suess and others,
articulated the modern concept of the “biosphere” as an organizing
principle for the Earth sciences, and pointed to the growing
planetary-scale impacts of human societies. 51
The experience of the Second World War gave new meaning to
these insights. The conduct of the war, its sheer impact on the
environment, and the use of nuclear weapons fostered a profound
appreciation for the capacity of human beings to fundamentally
alter and even destroy the conditions for life on the planet. At the
same time, as part of the war effort and in response to rising Cold
War tensions, the 1950s witnessed the beginning of major
government support for the development of tools and
infrastructures to systematically assess various aspects of the
Earth’s bio-geophysical systems. 52
By the second half of the 1950s, the general conception of
the Earth as an integrated system had begun to take shape and
drive specific research agendas. Increasingly formal approaches to
“systems thinking,” which soon came to dominate fields as diverse
as operations research and ecology, matched with growing
computational capabilities, provided the foundations for modern
Earth systems science. 53 This was perhaps most apparent in work
51F

52F

53F

51 See generally W. I. VERNADSKY, THE BIOSPHERE (1926) (articulating the
modern concept of the biosphere); W. I. Vernadsky, The Biosphere and the
Noösphere, 33 AMER. SCIENTIST 1, 9 (1945) (identifying “man” as a “large-scale
geological force”).
52 On the Cold War as a major impetus for the study of Earth systems, see
Ronald E. Doel, Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military’s Influence on
the Environmental Sciences in the USA After 1945, 33 SOC. STUD. SCI. 635 (2003). See
also EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 224–27 (discussing development of global data
infrastructures for weather and climate research in the context of the Cold War);
David M. Hart & David G. Victor, Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for
Climate Change Research, 1957-74, 23 SOC. STUD. SCI. 643 (1993) (discussing
emergence of climate research in the United States during the Cold War period).
53 See generally Peter J. Taylor, Technocratic Optimism, H.T. Odum, and the
Partial Transformation of Ecological Metaphor after World War II, 21 J. HIST. BIOLOGY
213 (1988) (tracing the rise of systems thinking in ecology in the post WWII
period). Thomas and Agatha Hughes have elaborated on the more general spread
of systems thinking:

[a]fter World War II, a systems approach to solving complex problems
and managing complex systems came into vogue among engineers,
scientists, and managers . . . . The approach spawned new academic
fields, new ‘sciences of management,’ and new modes of engineering
practice. It effloresced into a number of forms, including operations
research, systems engineering, systems analysis, and system dynamics.
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on bio-geochemical cycles and, specifically, research on the global
carbon cycle, which highlighted the large and growing
anthropogenic influence on the atmosphere. 54 Roger Revelle, the
famous oceanographer and one of the first scientists to raise
concerns about climate change, summed up the basic view in 1957:
54F

human beings are now carrying out a large scale
geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have
happened in the past nor be reproduced in the future.
Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere
and oceans the concentrated organic carbon stored in
sedimentary rocks over hundreds of millions of years. 55
5F

The next year, Charles David Keeling, a colleague of Revelle’s at
the Scripps Institute, began measuring CO2 concentrations in the
atmosphere at Mauna Loa Hawaii, providing the data for one of
the most important artifacts of climate science—the famous
Keeling curve showing continuous increases in atmospheric CO2
concentrations—and a powerful illustration of the growing human
influence on the climate system. 56
56F

Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes, Introduction to SYSTEMS, EXPERTS, AND
COMPUTERS: THE SYSTEMS APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD
WAR II AND AFTER 1 (Thomas P. Hughes & Agatha C. Hughes eds., 2000).
54 See Robert W. Kates, B.L. Turner II & William C. Clark, The Great
Transformation, in THE EARTH AS TRANSFORMED BY HUMAN ACTION: GLOBAL AND
REGIONAL CHANGES IN THE BIOSPHERE OVER THE PAST 300 YEARS 1 (Turner et al. eds.,
1990) (“Whereas humankind once acted primarily upon the visible ‘faces’ or
‘states’ of the earth such as forest cover, we are now also altering the fundamental
flows of chemicals and energy that sustain life on the only inhabited planet we
know.”).
55 Roger Revelle & Hans E. Suess, Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between
Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 During the
Past Decades, 9 TELLUS 18, 19 (1957). Since Revelle’s article, the “large-scale” or
“grand” experiment trope has been repeated often by environmental scientists
and others. Jane Lubchenco, for example, has asserted that
[t]he conclusions . . . are inescapable: during the last few decades,
humans have emerged as a new force of nature. We are modifying
physical, chemical, and biological systems in new ways, at faster rates,
and over larger spatial scales than ever recorded on Earth. Humans have
unwittingly embarked on a grand experiment with our planet. The
outcome of this experiment is unknown, but has profound implications
for all life on Earth.
Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for
Science, 279 SCI. 491, 492 (1998).
56 See Charles D. Keeling et al., Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Variations at Mauna
Loa Observatory, Hawaii, 28 TELLUS 538, 550 (1976) (“[T]he observed long term
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During this period, policymakers and scientists from various
disciplines also initiated some of the first international
collaborations to assess global environmental change. In 1955, for
example, a major international symposium at Princeton University
brought together scholars from the natural and social sciences to
take stock of the many ways that human societies were changing
the face of the planet. 57 The resulting volume documented, in
qualitative terms, numerous examples of historical and
contemporary global environmental change, with considerable
angst regarding the future. 58 Two years later, sixty-seven nations
launched the International Geophysical Year (“IGY”) of 1957-58—
the first major multi-national effort to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the Earth as a dynamic integrated system. 59
Among other things, the IGY witnessed the launching of the first
Earth-observing satellites and consolidated a global network for
57F

58F

59F

trend of rising CO2 appears clearly to be in response to increasing amounts of
industrial CO2 in the air on a global scale.”).
57 See MAN’S ROLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH (William L. Thomas et
al eds., 1956) (presenting results of the multi-disciplinary Princeton symposium
on past and present human impacts on the Earth).
58 See id. Lewis Mumford, one of the conference organizers, summarized the
implications of this new “planetary” understanding (and responsibility): “[f]or the
first time man may, as a conscious, interrelated comprehensive group, take
possession of the whole planet. For the last century, not merely have we been
able to think of the world as a whole, in time and space, but we have been able
throughout manifold inventions to act in the same fashion. Yet both our thinking
and our acting have been crude, not to say primitive, because we have not yet
created the sort of self, freed from nationalistic and ideological obsessions, capable
of acting within this global theatre.” Lewis Mumford, Prospect, in MAN’S ROLE IN
CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH, supra note 57, at 1151.
59 See William C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Climate Change:
An Historical Overview, in 1 LEARNING TO MANAGE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS:
A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE
DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 22–23 (Social Learning Group eds., 2001) (describing
the 1957–58 IGY as “one of the first coordinated, multinational efforts to study the
earth as a dynamic system,” resulting in “a revolution in our understanding of the
earth as a dynamic, integrated system”); see also EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 204
(discussing the “overarching purpose for the [IGY] venture: to study Earth as a
‘single physical system’”); Robert G. Fleagle, From the International Geophysical Year
to Global Change, 30 REV. OF GEOPHYSICS 305, 305–06 (1992) (tracing the history of
global change research and noting the importance of the IGY of 1957 to 1958 as
one of the first coordinated efforts to study the Earth as a dynamic system); Sheila
Jasanoff, Heaven and Earth: The Politics of Environmental Images, in EARTHLY
POLITICS: LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 44–45 (Sheila
Jasanoff & Marybeth Martello eds., 2004) (noting the importance of the 1957-58
IGY in laying the foundation for Earth systems science and in producing a new
kind of legibility capable of generating “facts on a planetary scale”).
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meteorological observations. 60 Together, these efforts provided
some of the first global data sets to support early general
circulation models (“GCMs”) of the climate system. 61
These early climate models, 62 although quite crude by today’s
standards, represented some of the world’s most sophisticated
scientific and technical work (second only, perhaps, to the nuclear
weapons programs) seeking to apply digital technology and
numerical simulation techniques to understanding complex
dynamic systems. 63 With leadership from John von Neumann, a
pioneer in the field of numerical weather prediction, Jule Charney,
and others, early modeling efforts were soon institutionalized in
various centers in the United States and Europe, all with access to
massive computing power. 64
As climate models grew in
sophistication, driven in large part by relentless advances in
computational capabilities, demands for data increased
substantially, and modelers worked to “couple” existing climate
models with models of the oceans, the cryosphere, the biosphere,
60F

61F

62F

63F

64F

60 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 207 (“The IGY marked a dramatic transition.
As a concept, with its single-physical-system framework, its emphasis on threedimensional observing systems, and its satellite data initiative, the IGY’s global
meteorology represented the cutting edge of science.”).
61 See Edwards, supra note 50, at 234 (”The IGY efforts thus represent the first
global data networks for constant, consistent, structured observation on a scale
and grid to match the emerging atmospheric models.”).
62 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 139–86, 337–55 (discussing historical
development of GCMs and their implications for knowledge about the climate
system).
63 See id. at 111–15 (discussing application of simulation techniques to
weather prediction). As Edwards goes on to note,

[s]imulation modeling opened up a way out of this quandary [the
inability to do controlled experiments on the Earth system]. Only
through simulation can you systematically and repeatedly test variations
in the ’forcings’ (the variables that control the climate system). Even
more important, only through modeling can you create a control—a
simulated Earth with pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases, or
without the chloroflourocarbons that erode the ozone layer, or without
aerosols from fossil fuel and agricultural waste combustion—against
which to analyze what is happening on the real Earth.
Id. at 140. On the development of simulation techniques, see Peter J. Galison,
Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone, in THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE:
BOUNDARIES, CONTEXT, AND POWER 118 (Peter Galison & David J. Stump eds.,
1996); see also Eric Winsberg, Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation, 12
SCI. IN CONTEXT 275, 276 (1999) (describing simulation as “a form of calculation,”
but with its own unique epistemology).
64 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 153–67 (discussing the first generation of
GCMs and the modeling groups that created them).
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and human activities—eventually seeking to simulate the entire
Earth system, “replicating the world in a machine.” 65 Taken as a
whole, the development of climate models and their supporting
infrastructures constituted an exercise in what Paul Edwards calls
“infrastructural globalism”—a long-term project directed at
building and elaborating “socio-technical systems that produce
knowledge about the whole world.” 66 Through these practices, the
climate system, together with the larger Earth system, became new
objects of knowledge and governance. 67
At the same time that the climate research community was
building new, increasingly sophisticated machines and ever more
expansive data networks to understand the Earth’s climate,
research during the 1950s on the cycling of radionuclides in the
environment as a result of nuclear testing paved the way for
improved understandings of global circulation patterns in the
atmosphere. 68 Tracking global fallout allowed meteorologists to
“trace the movement of air around the planet far more precisely,”
while fallout monitoring programs provided the first opportunity
to sample carbon dioxide concentrations in the stratosphere. 69 This
research “proved momentous for studies of anthropogenic climate
change,” producing “some of the first three-dimensional studies of
global atmospheric chemistry and circulation.” 70
65F

6F

67F

68F

69F

70F

Id. at 139.
Id. at 25.
67 See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, Why Believe a Computer? Models, Measures, and
Meaning in the Natural World, in THE EARTH AROUND US: MAINTAINING A LIVABLE
PLANET 70 (Jill S. Schneiderman ed., 2000) (discussing how modeling practices in
the sciences create new objects of knowledge). In his recent book on climate
change science, Paul Edwards takes this on directly:
65
66

[h]ow did ”the world” become a system? What made it possible to see
local forces as elements of a planetary order, and the planetary order as
directly relevant to the tiny scale of ordinary, individual human lives?
How did the complex concepts and tools of global thinking become the
common sense of an entire Western generation? How has systems
thinking shaped, and been shaped by, the world-scale infrastructures
that have emerged to support knowledge, communication, and
commerce?
EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 3.
68 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 207–15 (discussing contribution of fallout
studies to understandings of climate change).
69 Id. at 209.
70 Id. at 208–09.
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Fallout studies also provided the foundation for improved
understandings of the fate and transport of organochlorines and
other synthetic chemicals in the environment. 71 Based on earlier
studies of strontium 90 and other radionuclides, pioneering work
starting in the 1960s detected DDT, PCBs and other persistent,
bioaccumulative compounds throughout the environment—from
marine mammals in the Arctic to the breast milk of tribal women
in remote areas of Papua New Guinea—powerfully illustrating the
ever-widening reach of industrial chemicals and serving as a major
source of motivation for the early environmental movement. 72
Enhanced understandings of the global circulation of
radionuclides and other toxic substances were matched by a
massive expansion of satellite-based Earth observation during the
post-World War II period. 73 Driven in part by Cold War rivalries,
71F

72F

73F

71 See George M. Woodwell, Radioactivity and Fallout: The Model Pollution, 19
BIOSCIENCE 884, 884 (1969) (“Biologically active materials released into the
biosphere travel in patterns that are surprisingly well known. A major
contribution of atomic energy has been definition of those patterns, using as
tracers the radioactivity in fallout from bomb tests.”); George M. Woodwell, Toxic
Substances and Ecological Cycles, 216 SCI. AM., Mar. 1967, at 24 (discussing
contributions of fallout studies to understanding “global, long-term ecological
processes that concentrate toxic substances” in the environment). Similarly, John
Wargo notes that

[t]he U.S. nuclear weapons program unintentionally produced the very
first paradigm for understanding global environmental problems such as
climate change, ozone depletion, and mercury contamination in marine
food chains. . . . The pattern of discovery that radionuclides persist, move
through the atmosphere, follow complex ecological pathways that lead
to human exposures, and produce life-threatening health effects became
a model for later efforts to understand and manage pollution and
hazardous chemicals.
JOHN WARGO, GREEN INTELLIGENCE: CREATING ENVIRONMENTS THAT PROTECT
HUMAN HEALTH, at xvii (2009).
72 See generally H.L. Harrison et al., Systems Studies of DDT Transport, 170 SCI.
503 (1970) (discussing development and application of systems models for
understanding long-term impacts of DDT in ecosystems); S. Jensen et al., DDT and
PCB in Marine Animals from Swedish Waters, 224 NATURE 247 (1969) (discussing
early discoveries of DDT and PCBs in marine mammals); David B. Peakall &
Jeffrey L. Lincer, Polychlorinated Biphenyls: Another Long-Life Widespread Chemical in
the Environment, 20 BIOSCIENCE 958 (1970) (documenting presence of PCBs in
various environmental media and animal tissues); George M. Woodwell et al.,
DDT in the Biosphere: Where Does it Go?, 174 SCI. 1101, 1106 (1971) (describing how
global modeling supports assessment of the hazards of DDT in the biosphere).
73 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE: THE FIRST
50 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS (2008) [hereinafter EARTH OBSERVATIONS
FROM SPACE] (reviewing growth of satellite-based Earth observation since the
1950s).
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new satellite-based remote sensing capabilities created new “facts
on a planetary scale” by allowing particular environmental
problems to be comprehended and approached in ways (and at
scales) that were previously unattainable. 74
Atmospheric
conditions could now be measured throughout the vertical column
of the atmosphere, greatly enhancing the existing ground-based
observation system. Such advances allowed stratospheric ozone
depletion, for example, to be understood and framed as a problem
of global scope. 75 After some considerable work in transforming
the flood of new data into usable formats, satellite-based
observations also provided much needed data for ongoing climate
modeling efforts. 76 At the same time, remote sensing enabled the
first truly synoptic view of global land cover change, allowing for
major advances in understandings of the scale and scope of
deforestation and the role of land use in the global carbon cycle. 77
74F

75F

76F

7F

74 See, e.g., id. at 1 (discussing the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as a
transformative moment for Earth systems science); HAROLD A. MOONEY, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF ECOLOGICAL THOUGHT 49 (1998) (characterizing remote sensing
as “[o]ne of the foremost technological advances in recent decades” in terms of the
“amount and quality of information on Earth System processes, at frequent
intervals, and at many scales of resolution”); Jasanoff, supra note 59, at 45
(discussing efforts of IGY and the Earth sciences to produce “facts on a planetary
scale”). To date, only a few environmental law scholars have focused on the role
of remote sensing in environmental governance. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty,
Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 156–57 (2004)
(discussing the role of remote sensing in environmental monitoring); Kenneth J.
Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote
Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 219, 219–
20 (2002) (“Satellite remote sensing and digital systems, including geographic
information systems (GIS), provide powerful tools for visualizing and solving
complex legal and environmental problems.”).
75 See EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 38–39 (noting the
“rudimentary view” of stratospheric ozone distribution provided by groundbased instruments in the “pre-satellite era” compared to the “revolutionized”
understanding of atmospheric dynamics, and stratospheric ozone in particular,
made possible by satellite instruments); STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN & K. MADHAVA
SARMA, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE UNITED NATIONS HISTORY 5–19 (2002)
(discussing advances in Earth systems science and satellite observations that
allowed the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer to be approached as a
global environmental problem); SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, BETWEEN EARTH AND
SKY: HOW CFCS CHANGED OUR WORLD AND ENDANGERED THE OZONE LAYER 262–76
(1993) (discussing history and importance of satellite-based observations for
understanding stratospheric ozone depletion).
76 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 274 (discussing challenges involved in
assimilating satellite-based observations into usable global data sets for climate
modeling efforts).
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Simply
put,
space-based
observations
“revolutionized”
understandings of the global environment, creating a platform
that, along with emerging climate models, allowed the Earth to be
viewed as an integrated system. 78
It is easy to take all of this for granted today; to forget the
qualitatively different forms of knowledge entailed by these
developments when compared to previous understandings of
transboundary environmental problems. Based on exponential
increases in computing power, climate models today can achieve
resolutions that are orders of magnitude greater than those of early
models from the 1960s 79—allowing us to see the past, present, and
future of the climate system as a single ontological whole.
Likewise, remote sensing capabilities now provide real-time data
78F

79F

77 See, e.g., EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 84 (“The advent
of satellite data has revolutionized our ability to characterize global land cover
and monitor land-use patterns. Satellite sensors offer a synoptic view of Earth, as
well as the objectivity associated with a consistent measurement and
methodology for mapping the entire planet.”); Boyd, supra note 40 at 884–91
(summarizing key developments in remote sensing of land cover change); Ruth
DeFries, Terrestrial Vegetation in the Coupled Human-Earth System: Contributions of
Remote Sensing, 33 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 369, 383 (2008) (“The synoptic
view from remote sensing has transformed the perceived role of terrestrial
vegetation in the [Earth] system.”).
78 See, e.g., WILL STEFFEN ET AL., GLOBAL CHANGE AND THE EARTH SYSTEM: A
PLANET UNDER PRESSURE 271 (2004) (“Observation of the Earth from space has
revolutionised human perspectives and understanding of the planet . . . .”). James
McCarthy makes a similar point:

[o]ver the past three decades, a broad array of Earth-orbiting satellite
sensors and systems have evolved from proof of concept to operational
missions and have totally transformed research approaches in many
branches of the atmospheric, oceanic, and ecological sciences. . . . Satellite
sensors and systems now provide observational capabilities across the
Earth sciences with entirely new dimensions. Today we have geographic
continuity in data that was unimaginable a generation ago.
James J. McCarthy, Reflections on: Our Planet and Its Life, Origins, and Futures, 326
SCI. 1646, 1650 (2009).
79 See Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and its Impacts: Law, Policy,
and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1698 (2008) (providing a general overview of
climate models and noting the importance of understanding the uncertainties and
limits associated with climate models); Hervé Le Treut et al., Historical Overview of
Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 112–18
(providing an overview of the development of climate modeling and the
increased complexity and resolution made possible by advances in computational
capacity); see also Leo J. Donner & William G. Large, Climate Modeling, 33 ANN.
REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 1 (2008) (reviewing current state of climate modeling).
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on global atmospheric conditions and land-cover change across the
entire globe, while new “active” remote sensing applications allow
for three-dimensional biomass mapping across the Earth’s
ecosystems. 80 At the micro level, instruments can now detect
chemicals in the environment and human tissues at the parts per
quadrillion level. 81
Living in an age of global environmental assessment, we have
grown accustomed to a rapidly expanding knowledge base
regarding the environmental health of the planet. 82 From the IPCC
reports on climate change 83 to the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, 84 these large-scale assessments have allowed us to
recognize new facts about the global environment, providing a
powerful impetus for framing particular global problems—
biodiversity loss, stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change,
deforestation, persistent organic pollutants—that has in turn
underwritten a push for new global forms of environmental
80F

81F

82F

83F

84F

80 See, e.g., Gregory P. Asner et al., High-Resolution Forest Carbon Stocks and
Emissions in the Amazon, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16738, 16738 (2010) (reporting
on use of high-resolution mapping of carbon stocks and emissions in the Amazon
region); Gregory P. Asner, Tropical Forest Carbon Assessment: Integrating Satellite
and Airborne Mapping Approaches, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2–8 (2009) (discussing
opportunities to combine satellite-based remote sensing with new airborne
techniques for measuring carbon densities to develop high-resolution carbon
maps); Boyd, supra note 40, at 879 (discussing application of remote sensing
technologies to forest carbon mapping).
81 See, e.g., Ken Sexton et al., Human Biomonitoring of Environmental Chemicals,
92 AM. SCI. 38, 40 (2004) (“Specialists can now detect extremely low levels—partsper-billion, parts-per-trillion, even parts-per-quadrillion—of multiple markers
using a relatively small sample, say, 10 milliliters or less.”).
82 See William C. Clark et al., Evaluating the Influence of Global Environmental
Assessments, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS: INFORMATION AND
INFLUENCE 1, 2–6 (Ronald B. Mitchell et al. eds., 2006) (discussing growth and
influence of large-scale “global environmental assessments” over the last several
decades as important components of international environmental governance).
83 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007).
84 UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1, THE MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT REPORT SERIES (2005); UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SCENARIOS,
VOLUME 2, THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM REPORT SERIES (2005); UNITED NATIONS
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
POLICY RESPONSES, VOLUME 3, THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM REPORT SERIES (2005).
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governance. 85 By structuring our basic understandings of such
problems and by providing new institutional frameworks for
international collaboration, these new ways of seeing have
profoundly shaped our views regarding the possibilities for
response.
85F

2.2. The Project of Earth Systems Governance
Understanding the Earth as a single integrated system
combined with the recognition that human beings are altering
biogeophysical systems on a planetary scale has fostered a deep
commitment to particular forms of global environmental
governance over the past several decades. This distinctive
approach—what some are now referring to as “Earth systems
governance” 86—is not entirely novel, of course. In its basic
orientation, it shares a great deal with the high–modernist,
technocratic visions that have animated state projects of various
kinds throughout the last century, 87 and can be seen as a logical
extension of the early 20th century progressive program for natural
resources management with its strong endorsement of
rationalization, efficiency, and expertise. 88
86F

87F

8F

85 See Clark et al., supra note 59, at 22–26 (describing the evolution of
knowledge of the Earth system during the twentieth century and related efforts to
“manage” global environmental problems).
86 Earth system governance has been defined

as the interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and
informal rules, rule-making systems, and actor-networks at all levels of
human society (from local to global) that are set up to steer societies
towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to global and local
environmental change and, in particular, earth system transformation,
within the normative context of sustainable development.
FRANK BIERMANN ET AL., EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE: PEOPLE, PLACES AND THE
PLANET: SCIENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OF THE EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE
PROJECT 4 (2009). Though its lineage is much older, the concept has gained
currency in the contemporary period through the work of the multi-disciplinary
human dimensions of global change research community. See, e.g., Frank
Biermann et al., Navigating the Anthropocene: The Earth System Governance Strategy
Paper, 2 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 202, 203 (2010) (describing
new Earth System Governance Project of the International Human Dimensions
Program on Global Environmental Change).
87 See SCOTT, supra note 45 (discussing various “high-modernist” state
schemes to refashion and make “legible” various aspects of society and
environment).
88 See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY:
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890–1920 (1959) (chronicling the
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What is new about this late twentieth and early twenty-first
century approach to problems of Earth systems disruption,
however, is the imperative of globalism that inheres in the basic
framing, the notion that human and biogeophysical systems are
tightly coupled, the recognition that human activity is pushing the
Earth system outside of its “natural” operating state, and the
resulting conviction that global environmental problems are best
resolved through supra-national regimes. 89 “Managing Planet
Earth,” as the title of Scientific American put it in 1989, leads almost
naturally to a commitment to new international institutions
capable of mitigating transboundary environmental harms and
protecting the global commons. 90
Without question, the most successful application of this
approach has been the Montreal Protocol regime to protect the
stratospheric ozone layer. 91 Based on conceptual advances in
atmospheric chemistry and the deployment of satellite-based
observations, which “revolutionized” the understanding of ozone
dynamics in the upper atmosphere, 92 the stratospheric ozone layer
emerged as an object of worldwide concern in the late 1970s. By
89F

90F

91F

92F

dominant role of experts and the quest for rationalization and efficiency during
the progressive conservation era).
89 See David John Frank, Science, Nature, and the Globalization of the
Environment, 1870–1990, 76 SOC. FORCES 409, 411 (1997) (asserting that a substantial
increase in international environmental treaties “was catalyzed in part by a
conceptual reconstitution of the entity ‘nature’. . . [as] a natural system with
planet-wide interdependencies”).
90 According to William Clark,
[i]t is as a global species that we are transforming the planet. It is only as
a global species—pooling our knowledge, coordinating our actions and
sharing what the planet has to offer—that we may have any prospect for
managing the planet’s transformation along pathways of sustainable
development. Self-conscious, intelligent management of the earth is one
of the great challenges facing humanity as it approaches the 21st century.
William C. Clark, Managing Planet Earth, 261 SCI. AM., Sept. 1989, at 47; see also
Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 SCI. 494, 499
(1997) (“[H]umanity’s dominance of Earth means that we cannot escape
responsibility for managing the planet. . . . Maintaining populations, species, and
ecosystems in the face of those changes, and maintaining the flow of goods and
services they provide humanity, will require active management for the
foreseeable future.”).
91 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M.
1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
92 See EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 38–39 (discussing
role of satellite-based observations in revolutionizing understanding of
stratospheric ozone dynamics).
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the early 1990s, the international community had fashioned a
comprehensive legal instrument that allocated responsibility for
the problem among key countries and proved flexible enough to
accelerate the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances after
evidence emerged that there was a gaping seasonal hole in the
ozone layer over Antarctica—illustrating the power of Earth
systems science in facilitating international environmental
lawmaking. 93 The Montreal Protocol has thus been widely and
rightly praised as the first successful instance of international
cooperation aimed at managing a truly global environmental
problem.
Building on the Montreal Protocol experience, both the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)
and the Kyoto Protocol sought to carry forward the agenda of
Earth systems governance, embracing the overarching goal of
managing anthropogenic influences on the Earth’s climate system
in a comprehensive fashion. 94 Thus, the key objective of the
UNFCCC—”stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” 95—combined
with the Kyoto Protocol’s multi-gas, 96 multi-sector regime 97
directed at all major sources, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse
gases 98 bears witness to a fundamental commitment to global
environmental managerialism.
The Bali Action Plan, the
Copenhagen Accord, and the Cancún Agreement all seek to carry
this forward, embracing the ultimate objective of reducing global
93F

94F

95F

96F

97F

98F

93 See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 108–17, 163–217 (1998) (discussing new urgency
associated with advances in the assessment of ozone depletion, with specific
attention to the Antarctic ozone “hole,” and chronicling the response by the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol to strengthen the instrument and accelerate the
phase-out of ozone depleting substances); ANDERSON & SARMA, supra note 75, at
13–19 (discussing discovery and measurement of the Antarctic ozone “hole”).
94 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 12, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31.
95 UNFCCC, supra note 94, art. 2.
96 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, art. 3.1, annex A (”The Parties included
in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic
carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do
not exceed their assigned amounts . . . .”).
97 See id. annex A (identifying sectors that will be subject to emissions
reductions requirements for Annex I Parties).
98 Id. arts. 2–3.
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emissions in order to achieve stabilization targets and calling for a
comprehensive, multi-sector approach to the problem. 99
Of course, other powerful crosscutting norms and principles
have shaped, and continue to shape, the international climate
regime (such as it is). Principles of equity and common but
differentiated responsibilities, 100 national sovereignty, 101 polluter
pays, 102 sustainable development, 103 and precaution 104 are all
present in the Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the
various efforts directed at a new post-2012 instrument. Like all
consent-based international agreements, the climate regime reflects
the push and pull of various state actors and interests. But
underneath all of these, this Article contends, lies a particular way
of understanding the climate problem that carries with it a natural
affinity for globalist solutions.
9F

10F

102F

10F

103F

104F

99 See UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session,
Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan]
(establishing an action plan to develop a new legal instrument that would
incorporate “[a] shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a longterm global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the
Convention, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention,
in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities, and taking into account social and economic conditions
and other relevant factors”); Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24 (endorsing the need
for continued international action to combat climate change); Cancún Agreement,
supra note 24, para. 1 (affirming “that climate change is one of the greatest
challenges of our time and that all Parties share a vision for long-term cooperative
action in order to achieve the objective of the Convention, under its Article 2”).
100 See UNFCCC, supra note 94, pmbl., para. 6, arts. 3.1, 4.1 (acknowledging
that participation in the response to climate change should be on the basis of
equity and common but differentiated responsibilities); Kyoto Protocol, supra note
31, art. 10 (reaffirming principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”
for determining commitments under the Protocol).
101 See UNFCCC, supra note 94, pmbl., paras. 8–9 (reaffirming principle of
state sovereignty).
102 See id. pmbl., para. 3 (noting that the developed countries are responsible
for the largest share of historical and contemporary emissions of greenhouse
gases); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, arts. 3, 10 (establishing new commitments
for Annex I Parties while nothing that the Protocol does not introduce any new
commitments for non-Annex I parties).
103 See id. art. 3.4 (“Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable
development.”); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31 art 2.1, (discussing objective of
promoting sustainable development).
104 See UNFCCC, supra note 94, art. 3.3 (“The Parties should take
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects.”).
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None of which is intended to question the tremendous value
that stems from our ability to see and understand environmental
problems on a planetary scale. The point of this Article is not to
suggest that such understandings are problematic on their own
terms. Rather, the point is to recognize and explore the difficulties
that arise when such understandings are applied uncritically as a
template or roadmap for governance. As the Brundtland Report
pointed out more than two decades ago: “The Earth is one but the
world is not.” 105 Between these two phrases lies much of the
dilemma that has haunted modern international environmental
law since its inception.
But it is a dilemma that has escaped sustained engagement
precisely because it is anathema to the very premise (and promise)
of international environmental law: that the world can somehow
be brought together in the face of global environmental threats to
act as one through consent-based treaty regimes among state
actors. 106 The achievements of the Montreal Protocol reinforced
this conviction, deflecting attention away from the fact that the
relatively simple and unique circumstances that underwrote the
Montreal Protocol’s success provide limited lessons for the far
more challenging task of negotiating an effective international
instrument to deal with global climate change. More important,
this conviction fails to acknowledge basic questions of political
105F

106F

105 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 27 (1987). The
Brundtland Report echoed, in many ways, earlier work on global environmental
disruption.

In short, the two worlds of man—the biosphere of his inheritance, the
technosphere of his creation—are out of balance, indeed potentially in
deep conflict. And man is in the middle. This is the hinge of history at
which we stand, the door of the future opening on to a crisis more
sudden, more global, more inescapable, and more bewildering than any
ever encountered by the human species and one which will take decisive
shape within the life span of children who are already born.
BARBARA WARD & RENÉ DUBOS, ONLY ONE EARTH: THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF
A SMALL PLANET 12 (1972)
106 The Stockholm Declaration from the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment made the point explicit: “A growing class of environmental
problems, because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the
common international realm, will require extensive co-operation among nations
and action by international organizations in the common interest.” United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16,
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, ch. 1,
para. 7, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
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economy that are marginalized by the overall approach—questions
about fairness and distribution, questions about politics and
participation, questions about responsibility and underlying
drivers of environmental disruption—all of which have been
reposed, to a large extent, as technical (often legal) matters for state
parties and the international bureaucrats who serve them. 107
This process of turning questions of politics and political
economy into technical issues reflects a basic orientation in
international law and other expert discourses. 108 The project of
107F

108F

107 The more recent turn to “sustainable development,” made popular by the
Brundtland Report and codified in the Rio Declaration, reinforces this managerial
ethos. See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., supra note 105, at 49–65 (discussing
strategic imperatives of the effort to operationalize sustainable development);
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero,
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (promoting sustainable
development and related principles as overarching objectives of international
environmental law).
108 See infra Section 2.3.
In the context of international law, Martti
Koskenneimi makes the point directly:

The great achievement of Lauterpacht and his generation was to create
space for progressive law outside the vocabularies of nationhood. That
achievement came at a cost. Thinking about international law in
apolitical and technical terms opened the door for expert rule and
managerialism, not in competition with politics as in the domestic realm,
but as a substitute for it. What we now see is an international realm
where law is everywhere—the law of this or that regime—but no politics
at all; no parties with projects to rule, no division of powers, and no
aspiration of self-government beyond the aspiration of statehood—
aspirations identified precisely as what we should escape from.
Managerialism was the dark side of the inter-war project of imagining
international law in technical terms.
Martti Koskenneimi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007). There is a rich social science literature
exploring how questions of development and state projects of “improvement” are
built upon similar processes of rendering questions of politics and political
economy as technical issues reserved for experts. See, e.g., JAMES FERGUSON, THE
ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: “DEVELOPMENT,” DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREACRATIC
POWER IN LESOTHO 256 (1994) (showing how the international “development
apparatus” operates as “the principal means through which the question of
poverty is de-politicized in the world today”); LI, supra note 46, at 7 (“Questions
that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical.”); TIMOTHY
MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY 15 (2002)
(discussing the pervasive role of technical expertise in articulating programs of
national development and economic growth during the twentieth century);
NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 205 (1999)
(“When . . . numbers are used as ‘automatic pilots’ in decision making they
transform the thing being measured—segregation, hunger, poverty—into its
statistical indicator and displace political disputes into technical disputes about
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Earth systems governance takes this to a new level. Given the
sheer intellectual and institutional complexity of the task, it is a
project reserved by default for experts—a nascent example,
perhaps, of what Michel Foucault called “governmentality”— a
particular style of government built upon specific knowledge
practices that have made the Earth system into a thinkable,
governable domain. 109
As such, it can be viewed as a manifestation of the utopian
impulse of modern international law—a noble project aimed at
corralling and civilizing wayward nation states toward the
collective resolution of seemingly intractable problems that clearly
exceed the capacities of any single government. 110 Noble as it is,
however, at least two nagging concerns need to be confronted.
First, there are strong anti-democratic undercurrents apparent in
much of the expert discourse over global environmental
problems—reflecting a tendency, one might argue, toward a
permanent state of exception. 111 Garrett Hardin, whose famous
109F

10F

1F

methods.”); SCOTT, supra note 45, at 4–5 (describing modern “statecraft” as resting
on projects aimed at simplification and legibility).
109 See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 102 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (deploying the notion
of “governmentality” to capture an approach to government that first emerged in
the 18th century, “which has as its target population, as its principal form of
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of
security”); see also Eva Lövbrand et al., Earth System Governmentality: Reflections on
Science in the Anthropocene, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2009) (analyzing Earth
systems governance as an example of governmentality); Nikolas Rose et al.,
Governmentality, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 83 (2006) (surveying the development
of Foucault’s ideas on governmentality and recent work in a variety of fields
making use of the concept).
110 Cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005) (discussing utopian impulses embedded
within the structure of certain strands of international legal argument); MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2002) (tracing the liberal, “civilizing” impulse of
modern international law from its formative late 19th century roots through its
mid-twentieth century decline).
111 See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 6–12
(1998) (discussing the centrality of “bare life” to sovereign power and modern
trend toward permanent state of exception). The general point was made in
compelling fashion by a Brazilian participant at one of the public hearings held by
the Brundtland Commission in its preparations for OUR COMMON FUTURE:
You talk very little about life, you talk too much about survival. It is
very important to remember that when the possibilities for life are over,
the possibilities for survival start. And there are peoples here in Brazil,
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1968 article The Tragedy of the Commons 112 arguably serves as the
locus classicus for global environmental concern, asserted shortly
after that article that in the absence of “world government that is
sovereign in reproductive matters,” humankind is headed for
certain ruin in the form of global ecological crisis. 113 Echoing the
strong neo-Malthusian claims of the day, 114 Hardin’s views
acknowledge the strong possibility (even necessity) of a biopolitical project of exception. More recently, James Lovelock,
progenitor of the famous Gaia hypothesis—a sort of new age
packaging of the Earth system concept—stated emphatically that
the nature of our current ecological crisis “may require . . . the
suspension of democratic government for the duration of the
survival emergency.” 115 One does not have to look far to find other
examples. 116 And while these may be extreme positions—mere
12F

13F

14F

15F

16F

especially in the Amazon region, who still live, and these peoples that
still live don’t want to reach down to the level of survival.
WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., supra note 105, at 40. Shelia Jasanoff sees in
the observation of this nameless Brazilian
an eloquent critique of modern biopolitics . . . . Policy-makers concerned
with survival, this speaker from Brazil seems to say, will not be bothered
by the fates of living individuals in real communities. This is why, from
the standpoint of those ‘who still live,’ it is a sort of demotion, a ‘reaching
down,’ to become a cipher in a calculus concerned only with the
nameless, faceless challenge of planetary survival.
Shelia Jasanoff, A New Climate for Society, 27 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 233, 239
(2010).
112 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
113 Garrett Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, 24 BIOSCIENCE 561, 568 (1974). Elinor
Ostrom, among others, has criticized Hardin’s presumption that centralized
authority is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons, and her research has
demonstrated in multiple cases the adaptive governance strategies of common
property regimes. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 9 (1990) (“The presumption that an
external Leviathan is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons leads to
recommendations that central governments control most natural resource
systems.”); id. at 216 (“The models that social scientists tend to use for analyzing
CPR [common property resource] problems have the perverse effect of supporting
increased centralization of political authority.”).
114 See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1971) (discussing the
dangers of uncontrolled population growth).
115 See JAMES LOVELOCK, THE VANISHING FACE OF GAIA: A FINAL WARNING 61
(2009) (asserting that “orderly survival . . . may require, as in war, the suspension
of democratic government for the duration of the survival emergency”).
116 See, e.g., ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 106
(1980) (“For the majority of capitalist nations, however, I do not see how one can
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anecdotes that do not reflect widely held views—they highlight the
importance of examining carefully the implications of a seemingly
permanent environmental crisis couched in terms of a project
aimed at managing planet Earth for anyone concerned with the
task of building structures and institutions capable of responding
to such a crisis in a manner that remains accountable and open to
meaningful participation.
The second concern, while less conspiratorial in nature, is
ultimately much more fundamental: it’s not working! As Gus
Speth, a major participant in the making of both U.S. and
international environmental law, writes:
[t]hus far, the climate convention is not protecting climate,
the biodiversity convention is not protecting biodiversity,
the desertification convention is not preventing
desertification, and even the older and stronger Convention
on the Law of the Sea is not protecting fisheries. Nor are
they poised to do so in the immediate future. The same can
be said for the extensive international discussions on world
forests, which never have reached the point of a
convention. International environmental law has had its
successes . . . . These successes have tended to be narrow in
focus or regional in scope. No blanket condemnation of
international environmental law is appropriate. But the
bottom line is that on the big issues the trends of
deterioration continue.
With few exceptions, our
instrument of choice, international environmental law, is
not yet changing them, and the hour is late. 117
17F

Speth’s lament on the failures of international environmental law
fingers a number of culprits, but one of the more important is the
notion that framing a particular problem in a certain way—as one
of desertification or biodiversity or climate change—has, when
combined with the preferences of international law for the
avoid the conclusion that the required transformation will be likely to exceed the
capabilities of representative democracy.”); WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYAN
JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED: THE UNRAVELING OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM 215 (1992) (“[T]he steady-state society will not only be
ostensibly more authoritarian and less democratic than the industrial societies of
today . . . , but it may also be more oligarchic as well . . . .”); see also ANNA
BRAMWELL, ECOLOGY IN THE 20TH CENTURY: A HISTORY (1989) (discussing the
complex politics of ecological movements in the 20th century).
117 SPETH, supra note 28, at 96.
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Convention-Protocol model, translated into efforts to build legal
regimes around these problems in a manner that tends to address
symptoms and surface issues rather than deeper, underlying
causes of environmental disruption. 118 The result has been weak,
ineffectual treaties, and, in Speth’s view, a lot of time wasted
failing to prepare for action. 119 To be sure, there has always been a
certain poverty of imagination when it comes to alternatives and it
may well turn out that, in the “final analysis” as they say, this is
the best we can do. 120 For his part, Speth articulates several
complementary alternatives, from radical reform of existing
international environmental institutions and lawmaking to an
enthusiastic embrace of what he calls “green JAZZ.” 121 Old
governance and new, it seems, both have a role to play in trying to
move environmental law forward in the face of a world that is
exceedingly complicated and messy.
18F

19F

120F

12F

2.3. Implications for Environmental Law
The “touchstone” of environmental law, according to Richard
Lazarus, is “ecological injury caused by human activity.” 122
“Broadly stated,” says Lazarus, “environmental law regulates
human activity in order to limit ecological impacts that threaten
public health and biodiversity.” 123 It regulates, or seeks to
regulate, in other words, the process of “ecological
transformation”—an effort that “includes regulating the extent of
transformation, its geographic location, and, at least as important,
its pace.” 124 Ecological injuries thus have distinctive spatial and
temporal scales, and, as virtually everyone knows, these “spatial
12F

123F

124F

See, e.g., id. at 102 (concluding that treaty-protocol model of international
environmental law fails to address the underlying nature of the problem at issue).
119 See id. (identifying problems of international environmental law as
stemming in part from too many conventions trying to address too many
environmental issues that in turn “gives rise to coordination problems, limits on
participation . . . and various inefficiencies”).
120 See id. at 101 (noting the “failure of imagination” regarding alternatives to
the dominant “treaty-protocol” approach of international environmental law).
121 See id. at 173 (describing the JAZZ approach as one in which “people and
businesses create a world full of unscripted, voluntary initiatives that are
decentralized and improvisational”).
122 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2004).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 8.
118
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and temporal scales . . . have increased from the local and regional
to the global.” 125
All of which maps neatly onto the standard history of U.S.
environmental law. In the beginning, there were limited common
law actions, primarily nuisance cases, dealing with seemingly
discrete problems of industrial pollution. As common law judges
sought to balance the needs of a rapidly industrializing society
with the social costs of pollution, the limits of the common law
became apparent, giving way to local and state regulation,
sometimes with federal financial assistance, aimed at solving
increasingly regional pollution problems. This, too, soon proved
inadequate in the face of the intensification and growing spatial
extent of ecological disruption, providing the basis for the
federalization of pollution control embodied in statutes such as the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act and built upon a model of
cooperative federalism and an ever-expanding administrative
state. Finally, we end with the inevitable recognition that many of
our most pressing and intractable environmental problems are
global in scope and thus demand supra-national forms of
governance. 126
There is nothing incorrect in the way that the standard history
recounts the basic facts.
Like any good functionalist
understanding of law, it describes well enough what happened.
But there is something incomplete in how the story ends that stems
from a tendency to naturalize the issue of scale. In other words,
the standard narrative of environmental law—that ever larger
problems require moving to higher levels of governance—contains
within it a certain teleology that derives in large part from our
ways of understanding environmental problems, our assumptions
about scale, and what Elinor Ostrom identifies as an uncritical
acceptance of the conventional theory of collective action. 127
125F

126F

127F

125 Id. at 9. As Lazarus continues, “[w]e have traveled far beyond merely
scratching the surface of the planet’s ecosystem. Today we are ‘altering the
fundamental flows of chemicals and energy that sustain life,’ and ‘no ecosystem
on earth’s surface is free of pervasive human influence.’” Id.
126 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLICY 61–84 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the evolution from common
law to federal environmental laws in the context of air and water pollution).
127 As Ostrom notes,

[t]he applicability of the conventional theory [of collective action] is
considered so obvious by many scholars that few questions have been
raised about whether this is the best theoretical foundation for making
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Recognizing that virtually every major environmental problem has
turned out to be more expansive than first understood, with
“spillover effects” and “commons problems” providing the
dominant framings for the extra-jurisdictional reach of various
problems, leads naturally under the standard account to the
conclusion that environmental regulation and governance can (or
at least should) “scale up” in response to such problems such that
the appropriate level of governance is “matched” to the scale of the
problem. 128 As Professor Lazarus puts it when talking about global
environmental change: “the nature of the ecological problems to be
addressed compels the construction of an international
institutional framework for lawmaking and implementation . . .” 129
128F

129F

real progress toward substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and taking other actions to reduce the threat of massive harm brought
about by climate change.
Ostrom, supra note 29, at 9. Ostrom goes on to point out the general lack of
empirical support for the conventional theory in a variety of contexts and argues
for a more contextual approach to collective action related to climate change that
recognizes the value of “polycentric” approaches to solving complex social
dilemmas and the pathologies embedded in the view that the nature of the
climate problem requires a “global solution.” Id. at 4–13; see also Hari M. Osofsky,
Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J.
INT’L L. 585 (2009) (discussing issues of scale in climate governance).
128 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (“The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the
size of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should
determine the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution.”).
Jeffrey Dunhoff remarks similarly that
much of the rational choice-influenced literature attempts to ‘match’ the
scope or level of regulatory authority with the scope or level of the
underlying environmental problem. Hence, the focus is primarily on the
‘vertical’ dimensions of governance, and the central inquiry is whether
environmental problems are best addressed through more centralized
(say, international or national) or less centralized (say, national or
provincial) governance mechanisms.
Dunhoff, supra note 35, at 90.
129 LAZARUS, supra note 122, at 235; see also Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH L. REV. 570, 593, 626–27 (1996) (“The presence of
a transboundary harm demands some form of overarching governmental action
across the scope of the harm.”). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for
Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) (“When one examines existing
environmental regimes more closely, however, a paradox emerges.
Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority
in environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution
as a justification for this trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary
pollution actually exists.”).
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Taken to its logical conclusion, such a view leads to a preference
for more hard law and more government at increasingly higher
levels, manifest most prominently in calls for the creation of a new
world environment organization that possesses the tools and the
authority to deal with problems that are global in scale. 130 The
project of Earth systems governance and the related effort to
establish a comprehensive international regime to combat global
climate change represent the apotheosis of this approach.
But does anyone really expect to see a new world environment
organization with teeth anytime soon? Short of that, does anyone
really expect a new, post-Kyoto climate treaty that will include all
major emitters and impose a common regulatory architecture that
could dictate, much less enforce, national level commitments and
actions? If anything, the Copenhagen conference brought home in
no uncertain terms what many had already come to accept—that a
top-down, Kyoto-type architecture for dealing with global climate
change is simply out of reach for the foreseeable future. 131 Even
under the best circumstances, a ripening of the Copenhagen
Accord and the recently adopted Cancún Agreement into a new
legal instrument will still be built upon a plural, pledge-andreview architecture that translates, at best, into a series of loosely
linked compliance systems supported by robust international
monitoring, reporting, and verification (“MRV”). Moreover, even
if the UNFCCC parties are somehow able in the near future to
negotiate a comprehensive new treaty that could garner near
universal membership, it is obvious that much of the hard work
130F

13F

130 See, e.g., A WORLD ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATION: SOLUTION OR THREAT FOR
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE? (Frank Biermann &
Steffen Bauer eds., 2005) (presenting scholarly arguments for and against the
creation of a world environment organization); Steve Charnovitz, A World
Environment Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323 (2002) (arguing for the
creation of a world environment organization). Solving global environmental
problems, in this view, is often conceived as an enterprise that requires
international institutions that can somehow replicate the basic lawmaking and
enforcement capabilities that exist at the national level. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra
note 122, at 235–36 (concluding that “once the institutional frameworks [are] in
place, the increasingly compelling nature of the scientific facts regarding the need
for coordinated global action (as witnessed in recent years with the amassed
evidence of global climate change) would likely provide the needed impetus for
lawmaking and law enforcement to occur”).
131 There is some historical irony in the fact that the pledge-and-review,
schedule-based approach embodied in the Copenhagen Accord echoes earlier
proposals by Japan and other countries prior to Kyoto and looks similar to the
major emitters process that President George W. Bush initiated.
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involved in making such a treaty work will happen at national and
sub-national levels. Any way you cut it, climate governance goes
deep and will involve multiple legal and normative orders across
many different jurisdictions. 132 All of which underscores the
difficult but pressing task of rethinking the conditions of
possibility for climate governance in the post-Copenhagen world.
132F

3.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE FACT OF FRAGMENTATION

If one accepts the argument thus far (even if only for the sake of
argument), efforts to understand and inform climate governance
should start from the view that authority is fragmented, plural,
and increasingly difficult to harness toward collective global
projects. Such an approach differs from traditional ways of
thinking about environmental law, which often look first to the
nature and scale of the problem and then to the appropriate level
of governance and the policy instruments that will achieve optimal
fit. 133 While this may work fine in terms of prescriptions for ideal
design, it does not provide a sound basis for understanding the
challenges and opportunities facing environmental governance
going forward. Beginning instead with the implications of
fragmentation and pluralism for efforts to ground collective action
provides a more realistic point of departure for thinking about the
prospects for climate governance and the possibilities of global
environmental law. This Section explores these issues, building on
insights developed by scholars working on the implications of
globalization for law and governance, with particular attention to
13F

132 Viewed from this perspective, climate governance obviously implicates
multi-scalar, diagonal forms of regulation identified by Hari Osofsky and others.
See Osofsky, supra note 127 (analyzing the multiscalar aspects of responses to
climate change). Of course, the basic notion of cooperative federalism (and now
iterative federalism) speaks directly to the importance of engaging multiple
“levels” of governance in the effort to deal with environmental problems. See, e.g.,
Carlson, supra note 22, at 1101 (discussing the dynamic nature of iterative
federalism within the environmental context). Several legal scholars have recently
emphasized the importance of sub-national actors in plural approaches to climate
governance. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level:
Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors
(TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 726–58 (2008) (discussing the role of “translocalism”
in climate governance); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global
Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008)
(arguing in favor of a plural model of climate regulation that allows for multiple
regulatory systems); Trisolini, supra note 22 (concluding that local governments
are important actors in multi-level approach to climate governance).
133 See discussion supra Section 1.
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the role of the state and market institutions in fashioning effective
forms of climate governance in the context of a plural, fragmented
legal order.
3.1. Globalization and Environmental Law
Much ink (perhaps too much) has been spilled in an effort to
demarcate and define “globalization.” This Article will not
attempt to summarize this vast, unwieldy literature 134 other than to
echo what others have said before—that, depending on how one
defines it, globalization is not a new phenomenon when viewed in
historical perspective; 135 that globalization, though not defined as
such, is something that classical social theorists such as Marx and
Weber clearly recognized; 136 that the global has occupied a very
prominent place on the agenda of contemporary social science
since the mid-1990s; 137 that the intensification of international flows
134F

135F

136F

137F

134 See, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS,
ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE (1999) (providing an overview of various strains of
globalization studies).
135 See, e.g., 3 FERNAND BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH
CENTURY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD (Siân Reynolds trans., 1984)
(emphasizing the importance of a long-term, global perspective on economic
history); E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL: 1848-1875, at 48–68 (1975)
(discussing how “the tightening net of the international economy drew even the
geographically very remote areas into direct and not merely literary relations with
the rest of the world”); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM:
CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD ECONOMY IN
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1974) (linking the rise of capitalism in Europe to the
exploitation of the global periphery); see also DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK
POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMIC OF GLOBALIZATION 18 (2008) (arguing that “[i]t is a
rather parochial conceit of contemporary commentators . . . that globalization is
something unique to our time”); A. G. Hopkins, The History of Globalization—and
the Globalization of History?, in GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY 12 (A.G. Hopkins
ed., 2002) (situating contemporary understanding of globalization in historical
context).
136 See, e.g., KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 39
(Verso ed., 1998) (1848) (“The need of a constantly expanding market for its
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.”); KARL
MARX, GRUNDRISSE: FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 408
(Martin Nicolaus trans., Random House, Inc. 1973) (1858) (”The tendency to create
the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself.”); MAX WEBER,
Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 155 (H. H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., trans., Galaxy Book 1958) (1946) (“The fate of our
times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by
the ‘disenchantment of the world.’”).
137 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION THEORY: APPROACHES AND CONTROVERSIES (David
Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2007) (presenting various contemporary
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of people, goods, capital, technologies, and information does not
spell the end of the nation state; 138 and that lawyers and legal
scholars have spent a good deal of time (and spilled a good deal of
their own ink) facilitating various aspects of globalization and
seeking to understand its implications for law and legal order. 139
What is clear is that whether viewed in political-economic,
institutional, or cultural terms, globalization challenges the
traditional division of environmental law into distinct domestic
and international spheres—a challenge that environmental law
scholarship has recently begun to take up and one that calls for
more sustained engagement with the various literatures seeking to
make sense of globalization and its implications for law. To that
effect, while there is a long tradition of scholarship in international
law (public and private) seeking to come to terms with various
aspects of globalization and the international legal order, legal
scholars and social scientists of various persuasions have recently
begun to explore the varied and variable relationships between
globalization and law in more direct and ambitious ways.
Reflecting the dynamic nature of the field and the ongoing struggle
to develop a coherent understanding of globalization and its
implications for law (what Sabrino Cassese refers to as a “global
138F

139F

approaches to globalization); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MODERNITY (1990) (identifying globalization as a constitutive feature of the
modern world).
138 See, e.g., SASSEN, supra note 33 (discussing nation-state as a key institution
in facilitating globalization).
139 As David Kennedy notes
[e]conomic globalization means legal globalization; every crate travels
with a packet of rights and privileges, every transfer relies on a network
of institutions and rules. The internationalization of politics means the
legalization of politics. Every agent of the state, of the city, of the region,
acts and interacts on the basis of delegated powers, through the
instruments of decision and rule and judgment. Indeed, globalization
has fragmented both economic and political power, but it has not delegalized it.
David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827, 848
(2008). The extensive literature on law and colonialism offers another perspective
on the manner in which law has acted as handmaiden to particular processes of
globalization. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 889, 917–18 (1991) (discussing multiple ways in which European law
contributed to colonialism and capitalist expansion).
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legal grammar” 140), these efforts have embraced various labels and
pursued different points of entry into the subject.
Thus, at the most general level, a number of scholars have
sought to understand and theorize “the globalization of law” or, in
more truncated terms, the emergence of “global law” in multiple
substantive domains, public and private. 141 A key premise of this
literature is that the world of national legal orders is giving way to
a more globalized society—manifest in the growth of transnational
economic activity, the rise of a distinctly global politics, and the
increased density of international regulatory regimes—that is
calling forth and made possible by a proliferation of global rules,
norms, and institutions. 142 Somewhat more specific in approach,
Harold Koh and others have advanced the concept of
“transnational law and transnational legal process,” looking at the
ways in which specific norms (human rights norms in Koh’s case)
get articulated—often by so-called norm entrepreneurs—and then
“downloaded, uploaded or transplanted” into various legal
systems. 143 More recently, a growing literature has coalesced
140F

14F

142F

143F

140 See Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 973,
987 (2005) (“It is hard to analyze the vertical and horizontal concatenation of
national, supranational, and global law because we still do not know the
(incomplete, despite being quite developed) global legal ‘grammar’ . . . .”). But see
David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 654 (2007) (criticizing
efforts to fashion a unified legal vocabulary as a response to the pluralism of the
international legal order).
141 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 490 (2005) (arguing for an expansive
approach to “law and globalization” that recognizes the varied and complex ways
that legal norms are constructed and disseminated “in an era when the
prerogatives of territorially delimited nation-states, while not completely
unimportant, have become less salient than they once were”); Cassese, supra note
140, at 973 (discussing different types of legal globalization and their attendant
enabling rules); Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN.
REV. SOC. 447, 447–48 (2006) (contrasting the “ubiquity of law in the empirical
reality of globalization” with the “equivocal status” of law in studies of
globalization and outlining key elements for a theory of globalization and law);
Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1528, 1550, 1554 (2008) (book review) (highlighting the importance of moving
beyond debates over the merits of globalization per se to a focus on the “terms
and conditions of global law” and “how the distinctive features of global legal
processes . . . structure and constrain a global politics”); Martin Shapiro, The
Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993) (emphasizing the
limited, partial, and uneven globalization of public and private law).
142 See sources cited supra note 141.
143 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181, 183–84 (1996) (“Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice
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around the concept of “global administrative law,” with particular
attention to how principles of administrative law might be used to
resolve problems of accountability and “good governance” in the
development of supra-national regulatory regimes. 144
Other
scholars have focused less on evolving rules and norms than on
emerging architectures and forms, attending, for example, to the
structures that link different jurisdictions and regulatory systems—
”diagonal,” “intersystemic,” and even “dialectical” regulation 145—
14F

145F

of how public and private actors—nation-states, international organizations,
multinational enterprises, non-governmental organizations, and private
individuals—interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of
transnational law.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN
ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 753 (2006) (arguing that “[t]ransnational law represents a
kind of hybrid between domestic and international law that can be downloaded,
uploaded, or transplanted from one national system to another.”).
144 See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge
of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 694 (2005) (noting the
importance of ensuring “respect for the rule of law, the principle of participation,
and the duty to give reasoned decision” as the scale and scope of global regulation
increase); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006) (arguing for adoption of
administrative law principles in context of global policymaking to enhance
legitimacy and good governance); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (defining
“global administrative law as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices,
and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the
accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring that they
meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and
legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make”);
Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006)
(observing that “much of global governance can be understood as regulation and
administration, and that we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘global
administrative space’: a space in which the strict dichotomy between domestic
and international has largely broken down, in which administrative functions are
performed in often complex interplays between officials and institutions on
different levels, and in which regulation may be highly effective despite its
predominantly non-binding forms”).
145 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868
(2006) (describing “dialectical regulation” as a strong form of intersystemic
regulatory engagement marked by jurisdictional overlap and regulatory
dependence as compared, for example, to “dialogic” regulatory interaction
marked by information sharing and voluntary interactions); Paul Schiff Berman,
Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 929, 930–32
(2006) (characterizing “dialectical regulation” as a possible model “for
understanding the new plural order of multiple and interlocking governance
structures” that goes “beyond the relatively rigid legal doctrines of jurisdiction,
choice of law, and judgment recognition”). Berman goes on to argue that
Ahdieh’s model of dialectical regulation needs to be broadened beyond

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

BOYD.DOC

502

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:2

as well as the proliferation of networked forms of transnational
governance that wield considerable influence in particular fields. 146
And, of course, there is an extensive literature seeking to bring
insights from constitutional law and constitutionalism into the
study of the international legal order. 147
Although each of these different approaches carries with it a
distinctive mix of positive and normative concerns, all of them bear
witness to a broader effort to bring the study of law and regulation
into a more direct confrontation with a globalizing world where
hard distinctions between an international and a domestic legal
order, and between a public and private sphere, are increasingly
tenuous and where coordination between and among different
“scales” or “systems” of governance is where much of the action
occurs. 148 Lurking behind each of these perspectives, moreover,
146F

147F

148F

governmental actors to include the “wide variety of non-state normative
communities” that are “empowered” as “regulatory actors . . . in a world defined
by the simultaneous erosion of and persistence of territoriality as a relevant
framework for understanding legal authority.” Id. at 931–32. See also Osofsky,
supra note 127 (describing climate change governance as a multi-scalar process of
diagonal regulation).
146 See, e.g., Kanishkia Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of
Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 425, 446–47 (1999) (discussing the fragmentation of state sovereignty and
the emergence of regulatory networks as a form of “network governance”); ANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 31–32 (2004) (discussing the
“disaggregation” of the unitary state into its functional, specialized units and the
emergence of transgovernmental networks of regulators (and courts and
legislators) as key features of global governance); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David
Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 211,
218 (2006) (“Networks comport with deep-seated intuitions about how
globalization really works . . . . Regulatory networks parallel and comport with
the disaggregated but powerful way that globalization has actually happened.”).
147 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and
International Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 621–22 (2009) (defending
a “constitutionalist” approach to the international legal order). David Kennedy
takes issue with the “constitutionalist” approach:
Do we know enough about the structure of global arrangements,
whether legal or political, economic, cultural, to be confident that what
we know domestically as ‘constitutionalism’ is a good idea for the globe?
What if the distances are so great, the forces so chaotic, the differences in
situation so profound that the constitution ratifies what ought rather to
be transformed?
Kennedy, supra note 139, at 847–48.
148 See, e.g., GREWAL, supra note 135, at 20–22 (discussing the role of standards
in facilitating social coordination in a globalizing world); Robert B. Ahdieh,
Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination,
73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1223–25 (2008) (identifying coordination as “the central
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lies a recognition that the international legal order, such as it is, is
decidedly pluralistic and increasingly fragmented. Put another
way, there is a recognition among all of these approaches,
grudging as it may be in some instances, that the various processes
that we might group under the term globalization are taking place
within a dense, multi-layered, overlapping set of normative orders
and that this is not, save perhaps according to the ardent
constitutionalists, going away. 149
At the same time that the literature on law and globalization
recognizes, at least implicitly, the prevalence of pluralism and
fragmentation in the contemporary context (a topic that will be
returned to below), much of this scholarship also points to the
relative importance of environmental regulation as a key site
where law and globalization meet. 150 And yet, despite such
observations and despite the obvious affinity between our
intuitions about globalization and the transboundary nature of
many environmental problems (not to mention the proliferation of
multilateral environmental agreements over the last several
decades 151), we still have limited analytical equipment and lack a
well-developed research agenda for explaining how globalization
is interacting with environmental law across different jurisdictions
and problem domains.
Seeking to fill some of these gaps, Professors Tseming Yang
and Robert Percival have recently advanced the concept of “global
environmental law” as part of an effort to define a research agenda
149F

150F

15F

dynamic of institutional engagement across jurisdictional lines in a regime of
intersystemic governance”); Cassese, supra note 144, at 677 (“The most recurrent
functions in global regulatory systems are coordination, the promotion of
cooperation, harmonization, and standardization.”).
149 But see Sweet, supra note 147, at 623 (arguing that the perceived dichotomy
between constitutionalism and pluralism in international law is false).
150 See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 145, at 906 (“[C]ross–border environmental
regulation may offer the best examples of intersystemic regulation” that is truly
“multi-level”); Shapiro, supra note 141, at 51 (“Perhaps globalization is clearest
and most dramatic in environmental law.”).
151 See ADIL NAJAM ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: A REFORM
AGENDA 30 (2006) (discussing the proliferation of MEAs). More than 500
multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) are registered with the United
Nations. Id. And even though a significant number of these are institutionally
linked and/or regional in nature, it is clear that international environmental law
suffers from what some commentators refer to as “treaty congestion.” When one
recognizes that many of these instruments have spawned their own independent
secretariats and subsidiary bodies of various types, the fragmentation of
international environmental law becomes apparent.
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that is more sensitive to the realities of globalization and its
Borrowing from
implications for environmental law. 152
transnational legal process and other literatures on globalization
and law, these authors characterize global environmental law as a
field of inquiry that goes beyond previous efforts to chart the
adoption and transplantation of national legal principles by other
nations and international regimes to focus on “an emerging set of
independent and convergent legal principles” at multiple levels. 153
In their view, global environmental law embraces the idea that
“international environmental regimes are not stand-alone systems”
but “integral parts of a larger system that also includes national
regulatory systems.” 154 Such an approach, moreover, emphasizes
“problem-based approaches to regulation as opposed to
jurisdiction-based regulation,” and seeks to broaden the focus of
international environmental law “from negotiation and
formulation of limited legal commitments by each party to greater
attention to the design of institutional structures.” 155 Global
environmental law, therefore, seeks to move beyond the traditional
focus of international environmental law on the possibilities and
limits of consent-based regimes among state actors and abstract
arguments regarding instrument choice 156 toward a more
empirically grounded focus on institutional design and problem
solving that crosses multiple jurisdictional scales and attends to
multiple actors coordinating through a variety of organizational
forms. 157 Key examples include global regulation of consumer
152F

153F

154F

15F

156F

157F

152 See Yang & Percival, supra note 39, at 616–17 (describing global
environmental law as “a field of law that is international, national, and
transnational in character all at once” and that is emerging via pathways of
“transplantation, convergence, integration, and harmonization”).
153 Id. at 626.
154 Id. at 655.
155 Id. at 655–56; see also Ahdieh, supra note 148, at 1245 (pointing to “the need
for heightened attention to questions of institutional design in the interaction of
sub-national, national, and international authorities”).
156 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Weiner, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 681–83 (1999) (developing a model to test
“optimal” instrument choice for global environmental regulation under
alternative legal frameworks). But see David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental
Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 51–52 (2000) (arguing for
a “transnational legal process” approach to global environmental instrument
choice that attends to national legal and political context).
157 This resonates with the view of “modular environmental regulation”
espoused by Jody Freeman and Dan Farber. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A.
Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005) (discussing
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products and chemicals, the spread of environmental impact
assessments, and nested forms of climate governance. 158
In its overall orientation, global environmental law thus shares
a great deal with the broader, more established literature on global
environmental governance and its recent new governance variants,
which seek to understand the changing nature of environmental
regulation in the face of a bewildering complexity of state and nonstate actors interacting at multiple levels in ways that no longer fit
with traditional understandings of the Westphalian state system.159
A key theme in much of this literature, not surprisingly, has been
the changing nature of sovereignty in the face of global
environmental problems and the inability of the international
regime concept to capture the manner in which such problems are
being addressed. 160 Some scholars have even referred to the
158F

159F

160F

modular environmental regulation as an alternative to traditional approaches).
Global environmental law, in this view, is not simply a version of “comparative
law” as Dan Bodansky suggests. See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12–13 (2010) (characterizing global
environmental law as “the subject of comparative rather than international
environmental law”).
158 See Yang & Percival, supra note 39, at 619–23, 627–30, 635–37 (discussing
global regulation of consumer products and chemicals, the spread of
environmental impact assessments, and nested forms of climate governance as
emerging forms of global environmental law).
159 See Frank Biermann & Klaus Dingwerth, Global Environmental Change and
the Nation State, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1 (2004) (detailing how global
environmental change challenges the traditional Westphalian system by
undermining the idea of sovereignty); Sverker C. Jagers & Johannes Stripple,
Climate Governance Beyond the State, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 385 (2003) (arguing for
an approach to climate governance that includes non-state actors); Chukwumerije
Okereke et al., Conceptualizing Climate Governance Beyond the International Regime, 9
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 58 (2009) (advocating for an approach to climate governance
that incorporates the increasing visibility and influence of non-state actors).
160 On the changing nature of sovereignty in response to global ecological
disruptions, see, for example, Karen T. Litfin, The Greening of Sovereignty: An
Introduction, in THE GREENING OF SOVEREIGNTY IN WORLD POLITICS (Karen T. Litfin
ed., 1998). Litfin argues for an approach to sovereignty that moves beyond the
“geological model” wherein sovereignty is seen as being “’eroded’ by efforts to
address transboundary environmental problems.” Id. at 1. Instead, she argues for
a more relational, malleable conception of sovereignty that changes over time. Id.
at 1-2; see also Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029 (2003)
(developing the concept of relational sovereignty). As with static notions of
sovereignty and the “geological model,” the international regime concept, which
is rooted in the normative assumption that independent, sovereign states can in
principle develop cooperative approaches to global environmental problems, has
also come under enormous pressure as scholars seek to understand and explain
emerging forms of global environmental governance. See, e.g., Matthew Paterson,
Interpreting Trends in Global Environmental Governance, 75 INT’L AFF. 793, 794-95
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contemporary situation as one of “Post–Sovereign Environmental
Governance,” reading the prevalence of non-exclusive, nonhierarchical, and post-territorial governance forms in certain
contexts as symptomatic of an incipient logic of “new governance”
applied to environmental problems. 161
The post-sovereign claim, however, proves too much. Indeed,
it is only on the basis of a constrained and ultimately unrealistic
view of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states and its
transformation in the current context that one can sustain such a
conclusion. 162 It is not at all clear, in other words, that there is a
singular process called globalization that is leading toward a world
that is somehow post-sovereign or post-territorial, much less that
environmental governance is evolving towards some sort of postsovereign future. Rather, the processes that are commonly
16F

162F

(1999) (reviewing scholarship that seeks to go beyond the international regimes
literature to assess emerging forms of global environmental governance that
“break down the traditional dominance of states in such matters, and presage
alternative forms of global politics”); see also INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES
OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Peter M. Haas et al.
eds., 4th prtg. 2001) (arguing that effective international environmental protection
will require modifications to traditional notions of state sovereignty). But see John
Vogler, Taking Institutions Seriously: How Regime Analysis Can be Relevant to
Multilevel Environmental Governance, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 25, 38 (2003) (arguing
for a “re-invigoration of the regime approach to global governance through an
application of a social constructivist approach to institutions”).
161 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance, 4
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 72, 75 (2004) (“Post-sovereign governance exhibits three
distinguishing characteristics: it is non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and postterritorial.”) (emphasis in original).
Karkkainen draws heavily on “new
governance” theory and a series of empirical case studies of adaptive ecosystem
management (primarily in the U.S. context) to suggest that these “new
governance arrangements represent a nascent polycentric substitute for more
familiar forms of sovereign authority”—a development that “stands in sharp
contrast to the model of fixed, territorially delimited, exclusive jurisdictional
boundaries upon which the Westphalian system of sovereign states, and public
international law as conventionally understood, are founded.” Id. at 74, 77.
162 See LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN
EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400-1900, at 279–90 (2010) (taking issue with traditional idea
of territorial sovereignty through a close examination of the “production of
variegated legal spaces” and “layered systems of sovereignty” associated with
European empires); Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the
Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251 (2001) (taking international relations theory to
task for theorizing against a conception of the “Westphalian system” that is
largely imaginary when viewed in historical context); Benno Teschke, Theorizing
the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism,
8 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 5, 8 (2002) (arguing that the “decisive break towards modern
international relations is not marked by the Westphalian Peace Treaties, but
comes with the rise of the first modern state—post-revolutionary England”).
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grouped under the term “globalization” are better understood as
ones resulting in the re-constitution of sovereignty and territory in
multiple guises as global forms or projects of various kinds are
instantiated in the vernacular institutions of national and subnational formations. 163 Such processes inevitably result in forms of
governance that are uneven, lumpy, contingent, and incomplete
(whether in the context of climate change, human rights, trade or
financial markets), raising serious questions for some observers
about the analytical utility of the very concept of globalization. 164
The point, though, is not to debate the analytical merits of
globalization (a polysemic term to be sure), but rather to avoid
ascribing causal logic to a single, totalizing process. 165 By focusing
163F

164F

165F

163 See SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 4 (2007) (“Conceiving
of globalization not simply in terms of interdependence and global institutions
but also as inhabiting the national opens up a vast and largely unaddressed
research agenda.”).
164 As Frederick Cooper notes,

[b]ehind the globalization fad is an important quest for understanding
the interconnectedness of different parts of the world, for explaining new
mechanisms shaping the movement of capital, people, and culture, and
for exploring institutions capable of regulating such transnational
movement. What is missing in discussions of globalization today is the
historical depth of the interconnections and a focus on just what the
structures and limits of the connecting mechanisms are. It is salutary to
get away from whatever tendencies there may have been to analyze
social, economic, political, and cultural processes as if they took place in
national or continental containers; but to adopt a language that implies
that there is no container at all, except the planetary one, risks defining
problems in misleading ways. The world has long been—and still is—a
space where economic and political relations are very uneven; it is filled
with lumps, places where power coalesces surrounded by those where it
does not, where social relations become dense amidst others that are
diffuse. Structures and networks penetrate certain places and do certain
things with great intensity, but their effects tail off elsewhere.
Frederick Cooper, What is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African
Historian’s Perspective, 100 AFR. AFF. 189, 189–90 (2001)
165 See id.
Eric Wolf makes a similar point regarding the importance of
attending to relationships and processes:
The central assertion of this book is that the world of humankind
constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and
inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to
reassemble it falsify reality. Concepts like ‘nation,’ ‘society,’ and
‘culture’ name bits and threaten to turn names into things. Only by
understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing
them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope
to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding.
ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 3 (1982).
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instead on the relationships, linkages, and mechanisms that
constitute globalizing processes, we can understand and explain
how particular actors, institutions, practices, and places cohere in
specific global assemblages. Such an exercise, it is argued, should
be at the center of efforts to understand the implications of
globalization for environmental law and the ways in which global
environmental law is taking shape.
3.2. Unbundling and De-Nationalization
Taking globalization seriously as a point of departure for
understanding and elaborating global environmental law, whether
as object of research or as program for action, complicates the
traditional state-centric approach of international environmental
law, eliciting a more direct examination of how the state as an
institution and, more specifically, how particular states and state
capacities are participating in globalizing processes. Virtually all
of the literature on globalization, of whatever stripe, adheres to
some version of the general proposition that the traditional
Westphalian understanding of the state is under serious
pressure. 166 Thus, scholars of various persuasions have remarked
on the “unbundling” of territory and sovereignty as both a
background condition and consequence of globalization, and the
concomitant emergence of transnational regulatory regimes. 167
Much of the attention has focused on how sovereignty is being refashioned, often in the face of particular global challenges such as
financial regulation, human rights, or environmental disruption,
16F

167F

166 See Neil Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and
Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies, 28 THEORY AND SOC’Y 39, 47 (1999)
(noting that the “bundling of territoriality to state sovereignty is [seen as] the
critical characteristic of the modern interstate system”). For a critical examination
of the foundations of the Westphalian conception of state territorial sovereignty,
see Osiander, supra note 162; Teschke, supra note 162; see also BENTON, supra note
162.
167 For an early statement on this process of “unbundling,” see John Gerard
Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,
47 INT’L ORG. 139, 171 (1993) (identifying the “unbundling” of territory and
national sovereignty as a key feature in the transformation of the modern,
Westphalian international order and arguing that “[t]he terrain of unbundled
territoriality . . . is the place wherein a rearticulation of international political
space would be occurring today”). Ruggie goes on to decry the general lack of
attention to territoriality by students of international politics. See id. at 174 (“It is
truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by
students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground
that one is walking on.”).
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and the resulting disaggregation of state capacity into its functional
components, which in turn serve as key constituents of global
regulatory networks. 168 Less attention has been directed to the
manner in which territory (the other side of the Westphalian coin)
is itself being re-constituted at multiple scales and mobilized on
behalf of particular global projects.
Yet the very notion of an emerging global environmental law
contains an implicit territoriality that departs rather starkly from
the traditional understandings of territory in national and
international environmental law, which have been based in large
part on the model of sovereign states exercising authority over
delimited national territories. 169 To be sure, international law has
long struggled with how to conceptualize problematic spaces that
extend above and beyond the jurisdictional reach of the territorial
state—from the deep seabed to Antarctica to Outer Space—and the
territorial reach of the state has itself changed significantly over
time. 170 At the same time, the notion of extra-territorial jurisdiction
over particular activities has been a pervasive feature of efforts to
extend regulation beyond the borders of the territorial state. 171
168F

169F

170F

17F

168 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 146, at 12–15 (discussing disaggregation of
states and the consitution of global regulatory networks); see also BENTON, supra
note 162, at 282–90 (discussing the “layered systems of sovereignty” associated
with European empires); SASSEN, supra note 33, at 1–3 (discussing lack of attention
by globalization scholars to the ways in which globalization takes place in and
through particular national practices).
169 See Brenner, supra note 166, at 47 (discussing the traditional model of the
sovereign territorial state).
170 See Jean Gottmann, The Evolution of the Concept of Territory, 14 SOC. SCI.
INFO. 29, 30–32 (1976) (discussing the challenges of defining territorial rights in
international law posed by outer space and the deep sea bed). J.H.W. Verzijl
offers a more “graphic” view of the changing nature of territory:

State territory, conceived as the earthly space within which a State is
entitled to exercise exclusive competencies, has gradually developed
from a bi-dimensional, slightly spherical, plane into a tri-dimensional
body, extremely irregular and complicated in shape, as far as coastal
States with a continental shelf are concerned, showing to the eye of the
imagination the peculiar configuration of a huge aerial skyscraper with a
constantly soaring and broadening top structure, mounted partly on a
thin terrestrial socle or pedestal and partly on an iceberg-like submarine
terrace.
3 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: STATE TERRITORY
14 (1970).
171 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 94–96 (2009) (describing increased
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And, of course, environmental law has long been pre-occupied
with transboundary pollution, spillovers, and problems of the
global commons. All of these approaches, however, have been
constructed on the basis of a particular, naturalized understanding
of national territory, illustrating what one scholar refers to as the
“territorial trap.” 172
In contrast, a more direct interrogation of the concept of
territory as part of the effort to understand emerging structures of
global environmental law trains attention to the manner in which
space is produced and ordered as a precondition for environmental
governance. 173 The challenge is to recover a more general
conception of territory that is distinct from state sovereignty—one
that is rooted in the application of certain calculative and
cartographic practices to the creation of modern political and legal
space (of which the Westphalian model is the original form, but
one that is giving way to a more globalized and differentiated
ordering of territory). 174 In this view, although territory is
“integrally related to the state” by virtue of its dual instantiation
with the concept of sovereignty in the Westphalian system, it is not
“inherently tied to the state.” 175
In other words, shifting the view from territory as jurisdiction
to territory as a more abstract enterprise of creating calculable
space and rendering it governable 176 (with concrete manifestations
172F

173F

174F

175F

176F

extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic statutes starting in mid-twentieth
century).
172 See John Agnew, The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of
International Relations Theory, 1 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 53 (1994) (referring to the
naturalized, and untheorized approach to territory in international relations
scholarship as the “territorial trap”).
173 Few fields of law are more thoroughly spatial than environmental law. To
date, however, there has been very little effort to develop a theoretical
understanding of the complex spatialities of environmental law and governance.
See David Delaney, Environmental Regulation: Introduction, in THE LEGAL
GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 218 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds.,
2001) (discussing the limited intersection between environmental law and
geography). For a notable exception, see Osofsky, supra note 127.
174 Legal scholars have typically viewed territory as synonymous with
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97
MICH. L. REV. 843, 866–67 (1999) (locating the historical emergence of territorial
jurisdiction as the product of the science of cartography and the ideology of
rational, humanist government).
175 Stuart Elden, Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the
Space of the World, 30 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 8, 8 (2010).
176 See Michael Biggs, Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and
European State Formation, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 374, 399 (1999) (“It is easy
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in specific historical forms such as the territorial state) brings into
focus the ways in which new forms of calculability allow for
different renderings of territory, thereby opening up the possibility
of new claims, legal and otherwise, over particular places and new
forms of authority. 177 In this view, territory is less a background
condition—a “container” for sovereign authority—than it is a
political project focused on making space governable through
particular technical and legal practices. 178 The widely remarked
upon unbundling of sovereignty and territory does not, therefore,
mark the end of territory as an important feature of the
contemporary world order any more than it spells the end of
sovereignty. Rather, “[t]he historical moment we call globalization
demonstrates that the calculable understanding of space has been
extended to the globe, which means that even as the state becomes
less the focus of attention, territory remains of paramount
importance.” 179
17F

178F

179F

to say ‘the state mapped its territory,’ implying that a preexisting entity increased
the quantity of its knowledge. It is much harder to say that, through the process
of mapping, a new kind of territory and hence a new kind of state came into
being.”); Stuart Elden, Governmentality, Calculation, Territory, 25 ENV’T & PLAN. D:
SOC. & SPACE 562, 578 (2007) (“Territory is more than merely land, but a rendering
of the emergent concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, distributed,
mapped, calculated, bordered, and controlled.”). Charles Maier makes a strong
argument for the importance of territoriality to political history:
Territoriality has been so pervasive a principle for organizing societies
that only as it has begun to dissolve have social scientists and historians
come to fathom its role. Epochs of world history hinge not only on the
rise and fall of great powers or the successive struggles among mobilized
social groups but on the attributes of political space, whether weakened
or strengthened or rescaled into larger or smaller commanding units.
Charles S. Maier, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives
for the Modern Era, 105 AM. HIST. REV. 807, 809 (2000).
177 According to Nikolas Rose,
[t]o govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which
government is to be exercised. This is not simply a matter of looking; it is
a practice by which the space is re-presented in maps, charts, pictures
and other inscription devices. It is made visible, gridded, marked out,
placed in two dimensions, scaled, populated with icons and so forth. In
this process, and from the perspective of its government, salient features
are identified and non-salient features rendered invisible.
ROSE, supra note 108, at 36–37.
178 See Stuart Elden, Land, Terrain, Territory, PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY
ONLINEFIRST 12–14 (Apr. 21, 2010) (arguing for an understanding of territory as a
“political technology”).
179 Elden, supra note 175, at 8–9.
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Instead of emphasizing the emergence of post-sovereign,
deterritorialized forms of authority as evidence of some sort of
master trend of globalization (an observation that seems a bit
problematic in light of recent reassertions of national sovereignty),
it would thus seem more fruitful to examine how new
combinations of territory and authority are emerging out of
specific globalizing processes that are taking place simultaneously
above, below and through the state. 180 As an analytical matter,
such a perspective moves away from the notion of the state as a
unitary actor in an international system composed of formally
equal sovereigns interacting under game-theoretic constraints
toward an analysis of how particular states and their components
participate in and provide important sites for certain globalizing
processes. 181 As will be discussed further in Section 4, this
incipient “de-nationalization” 182 is increasingly apparent in the
environmental field as national and subnational authorities are
mobilizing in pursuit of specific global environmental projects.
And although there is considerable resistance in some quarters to
180F

18F

182F

180 See, e.g., SASSEN, supra note 33, at 386 (discussing “the formation of
particular types of territoriality assembled out of ‘national’ and ‘global’
elements”). As examples, Sassen cites (1) the formation of a “global network of
financial centers” as “a novel type of multisited territoriality” made up of
financial centers that “inhabit national territories” but are “denationalized in
specific and partial ways” given their constitutive role in the global capital
markets; (2) “global networks of localized activists” and the constitution of global
civil society that is enabled by global digital networks and represents a
territoriality that “partly inhabits specific subnational spaces and partly gets
constituted as a variety of specialized or partial global publics”; and (3) “new
jurisdictional geographies” in which legal frameworks for rights and guarantees
are becoming embedded in transnational systems, as evidenced by the ability to
initiate legal actions involving multiple geographic sites across the globe from
national courts or, alternatively, the manner in which international human rights
norms get established and stabilized as part of national law. Id. at 386–88.
181 See id. at 227 (“Failure to differentiate state capacities, both across
countries and inside a given national state, easily can keep globalization scholars
from considering, let alone examining, how states may at times facilitate
globalization.”).
182 See Saskia Sassen, De-Nationalization: Some Conceptual and Empirical
Elements, 22 POLAR 1 (1999) (“One way of conceptualizing this insertion of the
global in the national is as a partial and incipient ‘de-nationalization’ of what has
been constructed as the national, or rather, particular elements of the national.”);
Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation, 25 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1141, 1155 (2004) (“As particular components of national states become
the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central
to globalization, they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. This is
one instantiation of what I call a process of incipient de-nationalization.”).
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some of the more overt efforts to de-nationalize environmental
governance, 183 REDD and other emerging forms of climate
governance demonstrate how new forms of calculability are
already reshaping traditional understandings of territory—in part
by opening up possibilities for new value forms and new claims on
the environmental and resource practices taking place within the
boundaries of the nation state. 184 This is happening from above
and below and, while it hardly signals the withering away of the
state, it does illustrate the ways in which the state is changing as it
reorients its capabilities to participate in these new polycentric
forms of global environmental governance.
183F

184F

3.3. Pluralism, Fragmentation, Expertise
At the same time that globalization puts pressure on the
Westphalian state, it also brings into relief the plurality of
normative orders governing behavior across various jurisdictions.
Contemporary studies of globalization have thus brought with
them a rejuvenated interest in legal pluralism, the central premise
of which is that the world is constituted by a seemingly irreducible
diversity of legal and non-legal normative orders that coexist with
Initially the province of
the law of particular states. 185
anthropologists and a few anthropologically minded legal scholars,
legal pluralism in its early manifestations focused on the colonial
encounter and the diversity of legal orders that arose out of the
“intersections of indigenous and European law.” 186 More recently,
a post-1970s “new legal pluralism” has turned inward to focus on
the diversity of normative orders within the so-called advanced
industrial societies of Europe and the United States. 187
185F

186F

187F

183 Witness the ongoing resistance by China and other countries to subject
their domestic GHG mitigation efforts to robust international monitoring,
reporting, and verification.
184 See discussion infra Section 4.
185 See Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 244
(2009) (reviewing basic strands of legal pluralism and its move “into the
mainstream of legal discourse” as a response to the challenges of understanding
law and legal order in the context of globalization).
186 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 872 (1988).
187 Merry notes that

[t]he new legal pluralism moves away from questions about the effect of
law on society or even the effect of society on law toward
conceptualizing a more complex and interactive relationship between
official and unofficial forms of ordering. Instead of mutual influences
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Somewhat paradoxically, then, the turn to globalization has
reinforced the importance of both of these strands of research
through a general recognition that while certain globalizing
processes seek to superimpose an order or a rationality on the
contingent, the heterogeneous, and the local, in reality such
processes work within and through existing normative orders.
Instead of erasing normative diversity, globalization seems to be
enhancing it. Legal pluralism, in short, appears to be woven into
the very fabric of the world. “It is,” as Clifford Geertz remarked,
“the hardening condition of things.” 188 Recognizing this fact,
however, need not collapse into an “anything goes” approach to
global governance or one that operates as an implicit apology for
neoliberalism. 189 Rather, the task for global environmental law is
to find ways to coordinate across and within this plurality of
normative orders, building enabling environments that allow for
the translation of global projects into the vernacular forms of a
plural legal order. Easier said than done.
But it is even harder than that. Indeed, the fact of legal
pluralism—and it is a fact that international law has historically
ignored 190—finds its corollary in the increasing fragmentation of
18F

189F

190F

between two separate entities, this perspective sees plural forms of
ordering as participating in the same social field.
Id. at 873.
188 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective,
in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 220
(1983).
189 See Martti Koskenniemi, Member, U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Keynote
Speech at Harvard University: Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and
Multiple Modes of Thought (Mar. 5, 2005), available at http://www.helsinki.fi
/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d%5B1%5D.pdf (“The
problem with legal pluralism . . . is the way it ceases to pose demands on the
world.”).
190 As Paul Berman notes,
[t]hose who study international public and private law have not,
historically, paid much attention either to legal pluralism or social norms
theory. This is because the emphasis traditionally has been on state-tostate relations. Indeed, international law has generally emphasized
bilateral and multilateral treaties between and among states, the
activities of the United Nations, the pronouncements of international
tribunals, and (somewhat more controversially) the norms that states
had obeyed for long enough that such norms could be deemed
customary. This was a legal universe with two guiding principles. First,
law was deemed to reside only in the acts of official, state-sanctioned
entities. Second, law was seen as an exclusive function of state
sovereignty.
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international law into specialized, formal domains such as trade,
Within the
environment, human rights, and security. 191
environmental field, moreover, there is further fragmentation into
specialized problem areas like climate change, biodiversity,
chemicals, ozone depletion, and the law of sea (to name only a
few). And some of these specialized domains—climate change is
probably the best example—are themselves fragmented into
various functional and sector-specific areas.
One important consequence of this proliferation of specialized
regimes is increased dependence on experts and expert systems
and the concomitant de-politicization of questions previously
reserved for politics and political economy. 192 Indeed, a great deal
19F

192F

Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1174 (2007).
Similarly, David Kennedy remarks that with the
sheer density of rules and institutions in the global space [has come] the
disorderliness, the pluralism, the uncertainty, the chaos, of all those rules
and principles and institutions.
The globalization of law, the
legalizations of politics and economics, has brought with it a tremendous
dispersion of law. . . . Some of this disorder is structured in one or
another way—various federalisms, multiple jurisdictions, choices of law
provisions, even races to the top and bottom. But some is also a matter
of struggle and conflict, between legal orders, ideas, powers and
traditions. Our picture will need to have room for all this disorder—
there is no use denying or overlooking it, pretending coherence.
Kennedy, supra note 139, at 848.
191 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes:
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595,
596 (2007) (discussing fragmentation as “the increased proliferation of
international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and
ambiguous boundaries” that serves to undermine coherence and accountability in
the international legal order). Benvenisti and Downs argue that despite a general
lack of concern among legal scholars regarding the consequences of
fragmentation, it poses “a more serious problem . . . because it operates to
sabotage the evolution of a more democratic and egalitarian international
regulatory system and to undermine the normative integrity of international law”
by constraining the bargaining ability of weaker states, by providing powerful
states with opportunities to seek more advantageous venues, and by obscuring
the role of intentionality on the part of stronger states to “create a legal order that
both closely reflects their interest and that only they have the capacity to alter.”
Id. at 596–98; see also Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal
Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 382
(2005) (“Most predominant states have been active forces behind the development
of international law, and they have made extensive use of the international legal
order to stabilize and improve their position.”).
192 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between
Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing the increasing
fragmentation of international law into a series of specialized areas or regimes
dominated by technical experts).
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of contemporary global governance can be viewed as a field (or,
more precisely, a series of partially overlapping fields) dominated
by experts and expert systems without any real recourse to
democratic process. 193 International environmental law and the
entire project of Earth systems governance, for example, are deeply
embedded within expert systems that have succeeded in taking
fundamental issues of environmental responsibility, equity, even
survival, and rendering them technical through a particular set of
knowledge practices.
Any coherent account of global
environmental law will thus need to reckon with this fact, with
specific attention to questions regarding the possibilities for
accountability and participation in emerging forms of climate
governance. 194
Recognizing pluralism and fragmentation as starting points for
global environmental law thus means moving away from the
notion that a top-down, comprehensive global architecture is
necessary (much less possible) to respond to climate change or
other global environmental problems. In keeping with the
argument advanced in Section 1 above and as will be elaborated in
Section 4 below, to the extent that REDD, and climate policy
generally, are understood and pursued solely in such terms, they
will never coalesce into effective forms of governance. On the
other hand, simply recognizing the facts of pluralism and
fragmentation hardly provides a practical way forward. Plural,
polycentric, nested forms of new governance hold considerable
appeal in the abstract, but we need much more experience, more
thick description, of how these forms of governance are taking
shape in various environmental domains, and how enabling
environments that allow for coordination and translation across
the diversity of normative orders can be constructed in a manner
that builds upon the informal processes and institutions that all
formal order depends upon. 195 We need, in other words, more
attention to the connective tissues that bind and hold these forms
together. The following case study explores these challenges in the
193F

194F

195F

193 See id.; Kennedy, supra note 139, at 846–47 (discussing rising dominance of
experts and expertise in international law).
194 This issue of ensuring accountability in the absence of state-centered
democratic institutions has emerged as a principal concern of the growing
literature on global administrative law. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
195 See SCOTT, supra note 45, at 310 (discussing how all formal order depends
upon informal processes and institutions).
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context of ongoing efforts to bring reduced emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation into climate governance.
4.

GLOBAL PROJECTS IN FARAWAY PLACES: REDD AS AN
EMERGING FORM OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE

The enthusiasm surrounding REDD as an emerging form of
climate governance is apparent in the considerable traction that the
issue has gained over the last several years. In stark contrast to the
treatment of tropical deforestation under the Kyoto Protocol,
REDD has emerged in the eyes of many as one of the few bright
spots in recent international climate discussions, with near
unanimous agreement among the UNFCCC Parties on the need to
establish a new “REDD+ mechanism” that would provide
“positive incentives” (i.e., compensate in some fashion) to
developing countries for national-level reductions in emissions
from deforestation. 196 At the same time, policymakers involved in
the design of greenhouse gas compliance systems in the United
States and elsewhere are contemplating provisions that would
allow eligible REDD activities to generate offset credits. California,
for example, is considering what would be the first rules for
compliance-grade REDD offsets, 197 and all of the major federal
196F

197F

196

The Copenhagen Accord, for example,

recognize[s] the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and
forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas
emission by forests and agree[s] on the need to provide positive
incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a
mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial
resources from developed countries.
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, para. 6. The Cancún Agreement elaborates on
this, establishing a number of principles and a workplan for further cooperation
on REDD+. See Cancún Agreement, supra note 24 paras. 68–79 (establishing
principles and guidelines for additional cooperation on “policy approaches and
positive incentives” to build a viable REDD+ program); Id. annex II (establishing
two-year REDD+ workplan for Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice).
197 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA
CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Appendix A: Proposed Regulation Order §§ 9599195994 (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION]
(establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits and identifying REDD as
a source of sector-based credits); CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO
IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Part I Vol. I, Staff Report:
Initial Statement of Reasons II-48, III-22 to III-29 (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAL.
AIR RES. BD., Staff Report] (elaborating on sector-based offset program and
proposing that “the first sector-based credits to be incorporated in the cap-andtrade program come from Board approved REDD sector-based crediting
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climate bills introduced in the last two Congresses have included
Meanwhile, the donor
extensive provisions for REDD. 198
community, led by Norway, France, Japan and the United States,
has pledged several billion dollars for “fast-start” REDD financing
over the next several years, 199 complementing ongoing efforts by
the World Bank’s $300 million Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
to promote REDD “readiness” and pilot activities in some thirtyseven tropical forest countries. 200 Many of these tropical forest
countries are in turn reforming their own laws and institutions to
accommodate the possibility of REDD and establishing new
mechanisms, such as Brazil’s Amazon Fund, to support national
REDD programs. 201 And leading states and provinces in Brazil,
Indonesia, and other tropical forest countries are establishing their
own REDD programs—a reflection of the fact that many forest
governance responsibilities have been “decentralized” to the
provincial level and below. 202
198F

19F

20F

201F

20F

programs”) (quotation is at III-26). California has also been a leader in the
Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force (“GCF”), a unique multi-jurisdictional
collaboration between 16 states and provinces from the United States, Brazil,
Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria focused on the development of compliance-grade
REDD programs. See About GCF, GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE AND FOREST TASKFORCE,
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) [hereinafter
GCF] (outlining the objectives and activities of the GCF).
198 See, e.g., Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong.
§§ 744(e), 753 (2009) (providing for recognition of international offset credits for
certain REDD activities); American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R.
2454, 111th Cong. § 743(e) & tit. III, pt. E (2009) [hereinafter ACES] (recognizing
offset credits from certain REDD activities and allocating a portion of emissions
allowances for supplemental reductions of emissions from deforestation);
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. tit. III, pt. H
(2008) (providing set aside of emissions allowances to support efforts to reduce
emissions from deforestation); American Power Act, S. ___, 111th Cong. § 756(c)
(as circulated in draft form May 12, 2010) (recognizing offsets from certain REDD
activities).
199 See Beth Daley, $3.5b Pledge Buoys Climate Talks; Poorer Nations Hail
Tentative Deal to Protect Forests, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2009, at 6, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2009/12/17/35b_pledge
_buoys_climate_talks (“The United States and five other countries pledged $3.5
billion over the next three years to help developing countries protect trees . . . .”).
200 See About the FCPF, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, http://www
.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/12 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (describing
the work of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility).
201 See discussion infra Sections 4.2–4.3.
202 See, e.g., Arun Agrawal et al., Changing Governance of the World’s Forests,
320 SCIENCE 1460, 1461 (2008) (discussing decentralization of forest governance
over past several decades); Tanya Hayes & Lauren Persha, Nesting Local Forestry
Initiatives: Revisiting Community Forest Management in a REDD+ World, 12 FOREST
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Efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation are also gaining
traction in various private sector initiatives. Multi-stakeholder
commodity roundtables for soy, beef, and palm oil, for example,
are exploring ways to reduce emissions from deforestation through
supply chain certification schemes. 203 At least half a dozen
voluntary carbon market standards for REDD activities are in
various stages of development. 204 And the number of project-level
REDD activities in tropical forest countries has grown substantially
203F

204F

POL’Y & ECON. 545, 545–46 (2010) (reviewing extensive research on forest
governance decentralization and arguing for importance of decentralized forest
governance structures for the success of REDD+ initiatives). Elinor Ostrom’s
research has been particularly influential in highlighting the effectiveness of
decentralized forest governance. In her view,
[n]aive theories of institutions equate power and capability to regulate
events with simple systems that are organized in a clear hierarchy of
superior and subordinate relationships. Substantial recent research on
forest institutions has challenged the presumption that centralized
agencies achieve better regulation of forest resources than do more
complex, polycentric institutions.
Elinor Ostrom, Scales, Polycentricity, and Incentives: Designing Complexity to
Govern Complexity, in PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: CONVERGING
STRATEGIES 149, 150 (Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jeffrey A. McNeely eds.,
1998) (citations omitted).
203 See William Laurance et al., Improving the Performance of the Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil for Nature Conservation, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 377 (2010)
(discussing efforts of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil to reduce
deforestation impacts of palm oil production); Lesley K. McAllister, Sustainable
Consumption Governance in the Amazon, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873, 10878–80 (2008)
(discussing “responsible sourcing” and certification schemes aimed at improving
environmental performance of soy and beef industries in Brazil); Daniel C.
Nepstad et al., Globalization of the Amazon Soy and Beef Industries: Opportunities for
Conservation, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1595, 1600–01 (2006) (discussing potential
for environmental certification systems to reduce deforestation associated with
soy and beef supply chains in Brazil).
204 These include pure carbon accounting standards such as the REDD
methodologies being developed under the Voluntary Carbon Standard (“VCS”) as
well as project design standards focused on ensuring certain social and
environmental co-benefits from REDD activities such as the Community, Climate
and Biodiversity Alliance (“CCBA”) standards.
See VOLUNTARY CARBON
STANDARD, http://www.v-c-s.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (providing
background on program objectives of the Voluntary Carbon Standard); THE
CLIMATE, COMMUNITY & BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, http://www.climatestandards.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (providing an overview of The Climate,
Community and Biodiversity Alliance); see also ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF
THE FOREST CARBON MARKETS 2009 (2010) (reviewing status of voluntary forest
carbon standards).
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since the mid 2000s, with significant involvement from numerous
stakeholders and the private sector. 205
To supporters, REDD represents nothing less than the last best
hope for saving tropical forests on any significant scale and a
critical element in the effort to avoid catastrophic disruption of the
global climate system. 206 Others see it as an essential low-cost
mitigation option available in the near term; a way of reducing the
costs of GHG reductions and providing much-needed flexibility in
the transition to a low-carbon energy system. 207 Still others view it
as a key step toward engaging major developing countries such as
Brazil and Indonesia in the climate protection effort and a potential
pathway to a new paradigm for low-carbon land use. 208
205F

206F

207F

208F

205 See ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, supra note 204 (reviewing the status of
REDD projects around the world).
206 See, e.g., The World’s Lungs: Forests, and How to Save Them, ECONOMIST, Sept.
25, 2010, at 15, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17093495 (noting
that without a serious effort to make REDD work “the risk from climate change
will be vastly increased and the planet will lose one of its most valuable, and most
beautiful, assets”).
207 See MCKINSEY & COMPANY, PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY:
VERSION 2 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST CURVE 116 (2009)
(identifying avoided deforestation as large, low-cost abatement opportunity for
GHG mitigation); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
STERN REVIEW 537 (2007) (“Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and has the potential to offer significant
reductions fairly quickly.”); Nabuurs et al., supra note , at 543 (noting high
agreement and much evidence for conclusion that “[f]orestry can make a very
significant contribution to a low-cost global mitigation portfolio that provides
synergies with adaptation and sustainable development”). Reducing emissions
from deforestation, according to these analyses, could therefore provide
significant flexibility regarding both the sequencing of emissions reductions over
time and the geographic and sectoral distribution of such reductions (where
flexible). See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER & WILLIAM A. PIZER, THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2006) (discussing concept of “where” and “when” flexibility
in context of GHG mitigation efforts). The enthusiasm for REDD as a low-cost,
near-term abatement option (a point that the consultants from McKinsey & Co.
have been making for several years) needs to be tempered with some recognition
of the difficulties involved in getting the laws and institutions in place to make
this happen. One afternoon in an Indonesian village is all it would take to dispel
the view that this will be quick, easy, or even cheap.
208 Brazil and Indonesia are among the top global emitters when emissions
from deforestation are included.
See LARRY PARKER & JOHN BLODGETT,
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TOP 20 EMITTERS AND DEVELOPED
VERSUS DEVELOPING NATIONS 6 (2008) (“Land-use practices in certain developing
countries, notably Brazil and Indonesia, are having the effect of substantially
upping their relative emissions ranks: The ranking of their cumulative net
emissions from 1950 to 2000 rise from 18th to 5th, and 27th to 4th, respectively,
when land use is taken into account.”). For Brazil, emissions from deforestation
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Critics, on the other hand, charge that REDD is simply another
effort by polluters in the industrialized countries to avoid making
real emissions reductions at home—another version of “carbon
colonialism” aimed at appropriating cheap abatement
opportunities from developing countries, enriching private
companies, empowering certain state actors and driving new forms
of enclosure, all of which pose grave threats to the rights and
interests of indigenous peoples and local forest-dependent
communities. 209 Somewhere in the middle are those who consider
REDD to be overly complex and unrealistic given the current state
of forest governance (and governance generally) in many tropical
forest countries, and thus an expensive distraction from the more
pressing task of transitioning to a low-carbon energy system. 210
209F

210F

have historically accounted for some two-thirds of total emissions. In Indonesia,
the proportion is around 80%. See Gustavo A. Silva Chávez, Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions from Tropical Deforestation by Applying Compensated Reduction to
Bolivia, in AMAZON INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, TROPICAL
DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 73 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan
Schwartzman eds., 2005).
209 See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL, REDD MYTHS: A CRITICAL
REVIEW OF PROPOSED MECHANISMS TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND
DEGRADATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2008) (arguing that REDD could
“[r]educe developing countries’ sovereignty over their natural resources, by
prioritising investment decisions that focus on maximizing profits and allowing
foreign investors to buy up forest ‘services,’” “[f]oster an ‘armed protection’
mentality that could lead to the displacement of millions of forest-dependent
people, including by force,” and “[f]acilitate corruption and poor governance in
countries with tropical forests, because of the large sums of money proposed and
the complex nature of the financial mechanisms likely to be involved”); TOM
GRIFFITHS WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRANCESCO MARTONE, FOREST PEOPLES
PROGRAMME, SEEING REDD?: FORESTS, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1 (2009) (stressing that
“many initial REDD concepts fail to acknowledge forest governance problems, do
not propose forest tenure reform,” and contain no clear commitments to address
indigenous rights and equity issues).
210 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, ROOTS FOR GOOD FOREST GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES:
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNANCE REFORMS 33 (2009) (“In the specific
context of REDD, for example, it is widely agreed that without good governance
and promotion of legality in the forest sector, REDD schemes have little
opportunity to be successful.”); Rhitu Chatterjee, The Road to REDD, 43 ENVTL. SCI.
& TECH. 557 (2009) (detailing difficulties associated with the implementation of a
REDD project due to limitations in funding, science, monitoring, and complexities
of institutions and indigenous rights); Manish Bapna, Forests, Climate Change and
the Challenge of REDD, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/03/forests-climate-change-and-challengeredd (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (discussing significant challenges to REDD posed
by the problem of weak governance in many tropical forest countries).
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Put crudely, generalizations about REDD do not come easy and
much depends on where one stands. Viewed from above, REDD
looks like a paradigmatic attempt at Earth systems governance—a
critical step in the effort to manage the terrestrial carbon cycle and
bring it into larger structures of climate governance. Viewed from
below, REDD looks like yet another forest conservation scheme;
another iteration of what Tanya Li calls the “will to improve,” with
massive implications for existing practices of forest governance
and land use and plenty of reasons for skepticism. 211 Viewed from
the in-between, REDD looks like a host of mediating practices—
principles of GHG compliance market design, carbon accounting
standards, remote sensing technologies and MRV platforms, new
forms of property, private investment decisions, NGO
conservation agendas, national and subnational laws governing
forests and land use, and various norms and principles regarding
the participation and rights of local people—all of which might
provide the glue to make the whole thing cohere into an effective
form of climate governance.
For REDD to work, of course, many things will have to fall into
place and no single development at any level will be enough to
make the difference. As an emerging form of climate governance,
REDD is quite fragile and, as noted in the introduction, could
easily fall apart. Indeed, even if all of the necessary policy pieces
fall into place regarding the establishment of an international
REDD mechanism and/or the design of national and subnational
GHG compliance systems that recognize efforts to reduce
emissions from deforestation, unless REDD can be translated into
the vernacular institutions of communities who live in and near
tropical forests, it will surely fail. 212 This goes beyond simply
21F

21F

211 See LI, supra note , at 6 (describing experiences with various
“improvement schemes” in Indonesia and analyzing such schemes as a “distinct,
governmental rationality”); SCOTT, supra note (discussing various state-sponsored
schemes to improve the human condition).
212 As one commentator recently put it: “[m]ultispectral remote sensing,
international negotiations, and merchant-bank deals appear to offer a heady mix
of new opportunities to star-struck forest ecologists and conservationists, but
REDD will come to nothing if the system is not supported by the people who own
and live in the forests.” David Melick, Credibility of REDD and Experiences from
Papua New Guinea, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 359, 361 (2010). A recent study of
some eighty forest commons in ten countries identified positive links between
local autonomy over forest resources and increased carbon storage in forests. See
Ashwini Chhatre & Arun Agrawal, Trade-offs and Synergies Between Carbon Storage
and Livelihood Benefits from Forest Commons, 106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 17667,
17667 (2009) (discussing links between local autonomy over forest resources and
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getting the incentives right “on the ground.” It goes to questions
of meaning, significance, and value in these diverse and
complicated places—questions that clearly exceed the
methodological presuppositions of economics (not to mention law)
and require sustained engagement with the work of interpretive
social science and field-based research. Thus, to understand REDD
and the conditions for making it work, it needs to be approached
not simply as a global project but as an emerging global
assemblage of people, practices, organizations, laws, technologies,
and territories that is taking shape at multiple sites around the
world. Hence, the notion of global projects in faraway places:
REDD is a global project, but it is one that is being constituted in
faraway places—places that are exceedingly complex and that will
determine the fate of the effort. This section explores the REDD
case from this perspective, focusing on how REDD has come to be
constituted as a global project of potentially immense reach, the
manner in which it is taking shape in faraway places all over the
world, the changing natures of forest law and governance that are
accompanying REDD, and the ways in which new forms of value
are reshaping the relationship of the state to the forest, to local
communities and to forest-dependent people.
4.1. Making Forests an Object of Climate Governance
Before deforestation could be approached as a viable object of
climate governance it had to be understood as part of the climate
problem.
Although this may seem obvious from today’s
perspective, such an understanding did not emerge overnight.
Indeed, since the early 1980s, when the tropical forest crisis rose to

enhanced carbon storage). Of course, the concept of “community” is itself
contested, and efforts to translate REDD into local institutions must be tempered
with a critical appreciation for the politics of particular communities in particular
contexts. See, e.g., LI, supra note 46, at 230–69 (discussing how “community
forestry” has operated as a key vector of neoliberal development programs in
Indonesia); Arun Agrawal & Clark C. Gibson, Enchantment and Disenchantment:
The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation, 27 WORLD DEV. 629, 640
(1999) (criticizing tendency to embrace “community” as “a general answer to
conservation-related woes”); Michael Watts, The Sinister Political Life of
Community: Economies of Violence and Governable Spaces in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, in
THE SEDUCTIONS OF COMMUNITY: EMANCIPATIONS, OPPRESSIONS, QUANDARIES 101,
101–42 (Gerald W. Creed ed., 2006) (critiquing the widespread conception of
“community” as an “unalloyed good” through a careful analysis of communities
of violence arising out of the crisis of secular nationalism in contemporary
Nigeria).
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the top of the international environmental agenda, conservationists
and policymakers have pursued multiple forest protection efforts
outside of the climate policy context, jumping from one approach
to the next, with biodiversity, international trade, forest
governance, and the third world debt crisis motivating some of the
more prominent approaches to the problem. 213 While some of
these approaches have resulted in important conservation
victories, they have had very little impact on the problem as a
whole. At the same time, efforts to fashion a comprehensive
international legal instrument for forests, which began in earnest
during the early 1990s, have been a spectacular failure, foundering
on the fundamental conflict between the view of tropical forests as
the “common heritage of mankind” and forests as “national
patrimony,” as well as the perennial inadequacy of donor country
financing. 214 Thus, although there have been a few notable success
stories in the fight against tropical deforestation, particularly in the
establishment of protected areas, three decades of efforts outside of
the climate policy context have had little impact on the overall
scale of the problem. 215
The recent support for a climate policy approach to
deforestation stems in part from a recognition that past efforts to
deal with the problem have not succeeded and a growing sense
that deforestation and land use must be critical components of any
climate protection effort given their significant contribution to
global GHG emissions. But making deforestation into a viable
object of climate governance has proved to be no easy task,
depending on decades of scientific, technical, and institutional
work aimed at developing a new way of seeing the problem of
213F

214F

215F

213 See Boyd, supra note , at 863–66 (discussing various approaches to
deforestation outside of the climate policy context).
214 Id. at 865, 880 n.144; see, e.g., Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms:
States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 7–12 (2005)
(discussing the history of efforts to develop international legal instrument on
forests).
215 This is evidenced by the fact that deforestation rates, despite some recent
progress in Brazil, have not declined significantly during the last decade. See
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES
ASSESSMENT 2010: MAIN REPORT 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FOREST RESOURCE
ASSESSMENT] (reporting gross average annual deforestation of 13 million hectares
per year during 2000–2010).
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deforestation—that is, a new way of constructing the problem as
part of a larger effort to manage the global carbon budget. 216
Thus, intensive work in Earth systems science and carbon cycle
research during the post-World War II period provided the
conceptual foundation for viewing tropical forests as an important
part of the global carbon budget, highlighting the contribution of
tropical deforestation (and land-use change more generally) to
global anthropogenic carbon emissions. 217
The resulting
simplification of diverse tropical forest ecosystems to their
functional, aggregated role in carbon cycling (forests collectively
became a box or sub-unit in the larger terrestrial carbon budget,
which was itself a box or sub-unit in the larger global carbon
budget), 218 laid the groundwork for making forests an object of
climate governance. 219
Complementing these developments, the use of increasingly
powerful remote sensing capabilities enabled a previously
unavailable synoptic view of changes in global forest cover,
establishing the basis for mapping tropical forests as terrestrial
carbon stocks and providing an objective, transparent platform for
the monitoring, reporting, and verification of efforts to reduce
deforestation. 220 New “wall-to-wall” views of land cover change
216F

217F

218F

219F

20F

216 See Boyd, supra note , at 878–98 (discussing the scientific, technical, and
legal practices involved in making deforestation into a viable object of climate
governance).
217 See id. at 880–84 (discussing conceptual advances in carbon cycle research
that allowed forests and tropical deforestation to be understood as part of the
larger effort to manage the global carbon budget).
218 See, e.g., R.A. Houghton, Balancing the Global Carbon Budget, 35 ANN. REV.
EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 313, 316 fig.1 (2007) (illustrating role of vegetation and
land use change in global carbon cycle).
219 See Boyd, supra note , at 884 (concluding that the simplification and
reduction of forest ecosystems to their role in the carbon cycle provided a
necessary foundation for efforts to integrate forests into climate policy).
220 See id. at 884–91 (discussing advances in remote sensing of changes in land
use and tropical deforestation); see also Asner, supra note 80 (reporting on use of
high-resolution mapping of carbon stocks and emissions in the Amazon region);
Asner et al., supra note 80 (discussing opportunities to use remote sensing to
develop high-resolution forest carbon maps). Drawing on the work of Asner and
others, Google is developing a new platform that will enable “online, global-scale
observation and measurement of changes in the earth’s forests” by running highperformance processing of raw satellite data through the “Google cloud.” Seeing
the Forest Through the Cloud, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Dec. 10, 2009, 7:06 AM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/seeing-forest-throughc l o u d . h t m l . According to Google, the new technology, known as Google Earth
Engine, will provide a low-cost, publicly available, and transparent tool for forest
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and remote sensing techniques have allowed deforestation, and its
accompanying emissions, to be monitored at jurisdictional scales in
a manner that was simply not possible a decade ago. 221 By
“fundamentally alter[ing] the capacity to observe and monitor land
change,” 222 this emerging remote sensing infrastructure has
provided the technical basis for constructing new regulatory and
management strategies to integrate terrestrial carbon into climate
governance.
Finally, the ongoing development of certain legal and
accounting techniques, combined with the elaboration of standards
to ensure quality, have been critical in the effort to translate forest
carbon into a compliance-grade asset. 223 Specifically, the move to
jurisdiction-wide accounting for deforestation (at national and
provincial levels), which has itself been made possible by advances
in remote sensing and the ability to map forest cover change over
large areas, together with the application of particular legal tools
and standards that deal with environmental integrity concerns
such as emissions leakage, non-permanence and additionality, has
placed REDD within (or closer to) an equivalence space that works
for other fossil fuel related emissions. 224
Together, these ways of seeing have rendered a set of
phenomena previously viewed through the lens of biodiversity
loss, trade, macro-economic imbalances, and governance failures of
21F

2F

23F

24F

monitoring, reporting and verification to support emerging REDD policy
mechanisms. See Introducing Google Earth Engine, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Dec. 2,
2010, 8:00 AM), http://blog.google.org/2010/12/introducing-googleearth-engine.html.
(introducing Google Earth Engine platform, a free,
universally accessible source of remote sensing data and mapping capabilities that
will faciliate global-scale monitoring of the Earth’s environment, with specific
support for the development of systems to monitor, report and verify efforts to
stop global deforestation).
221 See Ruth DeFries et al., Earth Observations for Estimating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, 10 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 385, 389
(2007) (“High resolution data with nearly complete global coverage are available
at low or no cost for early 1990s and early 2000s . . . . These data serve a key role in
establishing historical deforestation rates . . . .”).
222 B. L. Turner II et al., The Emergence of Land Change Science for Global
Environmental Change and Sustainability, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20666, 20666–
67 (2007); see also DeFries, supra note , at 383 (“The synoptic view from remote
sensing has transformed the perceived role of terrestrial vegetation in the [Earth]
system.”).
223 See Boyd, supra note , at 891–98 (discussing various legal and accounting
practices involved in translating forest carbon into compliance carbon).
224 See id.
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various kinds comprehensible for climate mitigation efforts. In the
process, a new abstraction (a new global form)—forest carbon—
has emerged, opening up possibilities for applying particular legal
technologies and new forms of property that are pulling tropical
forests, and the many people who depend upon them, into new
regulatory systems and new value chains that are potentially
global in scope. 225
25F

4.2. Global Projects in Faraway Places
Without question, the effort to make deforestation into a viable
object of climate governance represents a socio-technical
achievement of the first order. But it is a long way from actually
integrating deforestation into climate policy, something that
depends upon a host of political and institutional factors operating
in many different places—from the U.N. process, to regulatory
design efforts in the United States and other jurisdictions, to a
diverse range of national and sub-national practices in tropical
forest countries. Thus, even if forest carbon can be fashioned into a
compliance-grade asset for GHG mitigation efforts; even if REDD
can be articulated as a coherent project of climate governance, the
overall success of the effort depends upon the ways in which this
all gets worked out in multiple sites around the world.
One very important site (or set of sites) where REDD is taking
shape is in the design of GHG compliance markets—at
international, regional, national, and subnational levels. 226 These
efforts endeavor to create a possible pathway for integrating REDD
into climate policy by leveraging GHG compliance markets in a
manner that channels financing to eligible REDD activities in
tropical forest countries through the recognition of offset credits
generated from REDD activities or the allocation of allowances (or
revenues from the auctioning of such allowances) to such
26F

225 For recent studies examining the emergence of new carbon property
rights, particularly in the forest sector, see INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR
CONSERVATION OF NATURE, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD: DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, (John Costenbader ed., 2009)
[hereinafter IUCN], DAVID TAKACS, CONSERVATION INT’L, FOREST CARBON: LAW &
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2009), and Samantha Hepburn, Carbon Rights as New Property:
The Benefits of Statutory Verification, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 239 (2009).
226 See Boyd, supra note 40, at 872–77 (reviewing various efforts to include
REDD provisions in an international GHG compliance system, the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme, U.S. federal cap-and-trade legislation, and in the California capand-trade system).
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activities. 227 California is currently the furthest along in terms of
developing a regulatory framework that could accept compliancegrade credits from REDD activities, which would likely be tied to
jurisdiction-wide reductions in specific states and provinces that
meet certain eligibility requirements and formally link with
California. 228
Consistent with these efforts, REDD has also become a major
focus of bilateral and multilateral climate change funding. 229 This
approach has been embraced by a number of governments, and is
often talked about as part of a phased effort that leads to eventual
full-scale engagement with existing and emerging GHG
compliance markets. 230 To date, several billion dollars in “fast
start” financing have been made available, with more expected in
the years ahead. 231
27F

28F

29F

230F

231F

227 The REDD provisions in proposed federal climate legislation in the U.S.
would do both. See, e.g., ACES, supra note 198.
228 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION, supra note 197, §§ 95991–94
(Oct. 28, 2010) (establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits and
identifying REDD as a source of sector-based credits); CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE
CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE 38 (Oct. 2008)
(approved Dec. 2008) (identifying the possibility of accepting offsets in a
California GHG compliance system from “those jurisdictions that demonstrate
performance . . . in reducing emissions or enhancing sequestration through
eligible forest carbon activities in accordance with appropriate national or subnational accounting frameworks”).
229 See, e.g., ARILD ANGELSEN ET AL., MERIDIAN INST., REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM
DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD): AN OPTIONS ASSESSMENT
REPORT 4–11 (2009) (discussing options for the mobilization and delivery of
international finance for REDD). For an overview of the current state of climate
funding, including funding for REDD, see Climate Funds Update, THE GREEN
POLITICAL FOUND., http://www.climatefundsupdate.org (last visited Nov. 24,
2010).
230 See ANGELSEN ET AL., supra note 229, at 3 (advocating a phased approach to
REDD).
231 Norway, for example, has committed one billion dollars for REDD
activities in Brazil and one billion dollars for REDD activities in Indonesia. See
Brazil Offered $1 Billion to Save Amazon Forest, MSNBC (Sept. 16, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26744780/ (stating that Norway’s billion dollar
donation to Brazil is contingent on clear documentation that deforestation is being
reduced); Norway Pledges $1 billion for REDD as Indonesia Re-Affirms Commitment to
Scheme,
ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE
(May
27,
2010)
http://www
.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7569&se
ction=news_articles&eod=1 (describing Norwegian commitment to Indonesia for
activities to reduce emissions from deforestation). The current 2011 U.S.
appropriation for REDD activities is expected to be on the order of $300 million,
representing a part of the U.S. pledge of $1 billion for REDD activities during
2010-12. See U.S. International Climate Change Finance, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr.
2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140689.pdf (last visited
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As a result, much of the focus on REDD at the international
level has been on developing the programmatic and institutional
frameworks to channel bilateral and multilateral donor financing
to REDD activities in tropical forest countries. Most of the
attention, not surprisingly, has been directed at “capacity
building” or what is sometimes referred to as “REDD readiness” in
an effort to prepare tropical forest countries for participation in a
future REDD mechanism or other GHG compliance systems. The
result is a potentially far-reaching realignment of governmental
institutions and practices to support REDD, illustrating precisely
the process of “de-nationalization” referred to above. 232
Indeed, as a consequence of the increasing flow of REDD funds
to tropical forest countries, combined with growing internal
support for REDD, particular organs of the state—Ministries of
Environment, Forestry, Agriculture, even Finance—are being
partially pulled out of their national administrative contexts,
bulked up, and redirected toward this global project. At the same
time, as will be discussed in the next section, new laws governing
forests and land use are being enacted in order to prepare the
ground for REDD by defining carbon rights, clarifying land tenure,
and establishing new ecological zoning requirements. 233 New
institutions are also being established that directly challenge
traditional conceptions of the state. In 2008, for example, Brazil
created the Amazon Fund—a multi-stakeholder institution
23F

23F

Nov. 28, 2010) (emphasizing the U.S.’s commitment to REDD+ financing as part of
its Copenhagen Accord commitment). Other major donor countries such as
Germany and Japan have collectively pledged some one billion dollars. See
WORLD RES. INST., SUMMARY OF CLIMATE FINANCE PLEDGES PUT FORWARD BY
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (2010) (summarizing climate pledges made by selected
countries). Several multilateral entities are also providing significant financing for
REDD activities. The World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility has an
initial capitalization of $300 million, and the U.N. REDD program is currently
funded at $48 million. See World Bank Offers $300M for Forest Conservation,
Emissions Reductions, MONGABAY.COM (Oct. 15, 2007), http://news
.mongabay.com/2007/1015-world_bank.html (stipulating the World Bank’s plan
to “help developing countries build the technical, regulatory, and sustainable
forestry capacity to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation”)
(internal quotations omitted); UN REDD: More Countries, More Financing, CARBON
POSITIVE (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx
?articleID=1941 (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (introducing the U.N. REDD program).
232 See supra Section 2.2; SASSEN, supra note 33, at 223 (discussing how
formerly national agendas and “[p]articular components of the national state” are
“denationalized” and reoriented toward the needs of a global economy).
233 See supra Section 3.3 (examining some of the implications of globalization
for global environmental law).
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governed by representatives from the states, the federal
government and civil society that is independently administered
by the country’s largest private development bank, BNDES—to
allocate more than $1 billion in donor financing to various REDD
activities. 234 Indonesia is also developing a new institutional
framework to allocate REDD-related financial flows in the wake of
the Norwegian government’s recent pledge of $1 billion for REDD
activities in that country. 235
Subnational governments throughout the tropics are also
mobilizing around REDD and will likely receive a portion of the
interim REDD public financing discussed above given that much
of forest governance (as an administrative matter) has been
devolved to sub-national levels. 236 In fact, many key states and
provinces in large tropical forest countries are progressing faster
on REDD than their respective national governments and, as a
result, there is a considerable amount of REDD-related activity
happening at provincial, district, and municipal levels. In Brazil,
for example, the state of Amazonas has passed climate legislation
that specifically addresses REDD. 237 The State of Acre has recently
enacted a comprehensive statewide environmental services
program based on an elaborate multi-stakeholder process with
234F

235F

236F

237F

234 See Decreto No. 6.527, de 1 de agosto de 2008, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 4.8.2008 (Braz.) (establishing the Amazon Fund). See generally FUNDO
AMAZÔNIA, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2010)
(describing the purpose, organization, and operation of the Amazon Fund).
235 See Fitrian Ardiansyah, Untangling the Web of REDD Governance, JAKARTA
POST (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/03
/untangling-web-redd-governance.html (discussing proposed new institutional
mechanisms for REDD within the Indonesian government in the wake of
Norway’s $1 billion commitment).
236 See Agrawal et al., supra note 202 (describing recent shift toward
decentralized forest governance); Krister Andersson, Understanding Decentralized
Forest Governance: An Application of the Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework, 2 SUSTAINABILITY: SCI., PRAC., & POL’Y 25 (2006) (evaluating local
institutional strategies associated with effective forest governance); Hayes &
Persha, supra note 201 (detailing research on forest governance decentralization
and arguing that decentralized forest governance structures are necessary for the
success of REDD+ initiatives).
237 The law encourages “the creation of market instruments to enable the
execution of projects for reducing deforestation emissions.” Lei sobre Mudanças
Climáticas, Conservação Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentável do
Amazonas, PEMC-AM [Law of Climate Change, Environmental Conservation,
and Sustainable Development], State Law No. 3135, arts. 2(II) & 3(I) (June 5, 2007)
(State of Amazonas, Brazil).
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REDD as the centerpiece. 238 Mato Grosso has adopted an official
deforestation reduction target and is working to regularize land
tenure and register property owners as part of an innovative,
remote-sensing based environmental licensing program. 239 In
Indonesia, East and West Kalimantan have both adopted provincelevel REDD programs as part of broader low-carbon development
strategies that are tied directly to forest districts. 240 Aceh has
instituted a moratorium on logging, created a high-level REDD
task force composed of government and non-governmental
representatives, and placed most of the tropical forests in the
province into two very large REDD projects, both of which depend
upon significant involvement by local communities. 241 On the
other side of the archipelago, Papua is working closely with NGOs
and the private sector to develop province-level accounting
frameworks and architectures for nesting project activities within
this larger jurisdictional framework. 242 Many of these states and
238F

239F

240F

241F

24F

238 See Do Sistema Estadual De Incentivos A Serviços Ambientais – Sisa [State
System of Incentives for Environmental Services], Lei No 2.308 (Oct. 22, 2010)
(State of Acre, Brazil).
239 See
INSTITUTO CENTRO DE VIDA, REFERENCE DOCUMENT FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MATO GROSSO STATE’S REDD PROGRAM (Dec. 2009) (describing
REDD activities in Mato Grosso); ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., BRAZIL’S EMERGING
SECTORAL FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND
DEGRADATION AND THE POTENTIAL TO DELIVER GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
REDUCTIONS FROM AVOIDED DEFORESTATION IN THE AMAZON’S XINGU RIVER BASIN, at
3-11 to 3-14 (2010) (describing Mato Grosso’s REDD Program).
240 See Awang Faroek, Gubernur Provinsi Kalimantan Timur [Gov. East
Kalimantan],
Rencana Aksi Antisipasi Pemanasan Global Dan Mitigasi
Perubahan Iklim Melalui Kaltim Hijau Tahun 2010–2014 [Presentation at the GCF
Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia] (May 2010), available at http://www
.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May_Aceh/Day_1_2/East%20Kalimantan%20Prese
ntation%20(May%2018%202010).pdf (detailing East Kalimantan’s REDD
activities); West Kalimantan Redd Team, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda
Aceh, Indonesia: Overview of REDD in West Kalimantan Province (May 2010),
available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May_Aceh/Day_1_2/West
%20Kalimantan%20Presentation%20(May%2018%202010).pdf (discussing REDD
activities in West Kalimantan).
241 See Aceh, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, Aceh
Province REDD Progress Update (May 2010), available at http://www
.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May_Aceh/Day_1_2/Aceh%20Presentation%20(M
ay%2018%202010).pdf (summarizing REDD activies in Aceh); see also JANE
DUNLOP, REDD, TENURE AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES: A STUDY FROM ACEH, INDONESIA
11–16 (2009) (describing REDD initiatives in Aceh).
242 See Noak Kapisa, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh,
Indonesia, REDD and a Low-Carbon Economy: Update from Papua Province,
(May 2010),
available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May
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provinces are also partnering with California and other
jurisdictions from around the world through the Governors’
Climate and Forests Task Force (“GCF”) to develop frameworks
for subnational approaches to REDD with the overall goal of
generating compliance grade emissions reductions that could one
day be accepted in emerging GHG compliance systems, such as
California’s cap-and-trade program, and other pay-forperformance schemes. 243 While much of this work is still in a
formative stage, some of it still just on paper, and while there are
plenty of hurdles ahead, it indicates the critical role that
subnational governments are playing in operationalizing REDD.
As a global project, then, REDD is taking shape in national and
sub-national institutions all over the world: in Bonn, Oslo,
Washington, and Sacramento; in Brasilia, Jakarta, and Mexico City.
But also in the state and provincial capitals of Aceh, Acre,
Amazonas, Chiapas, Cross River State, the Kalimantans, Mato
Grosso, Papua, and Pará. And finally, in a host of local
communities and projects (large and small) scattered across the
tropical world—from the Ulu Masen project on the northern tip of
Sumatra, 244 to the massive Xingu carbon project in the Brazilian
Amazon, 245 the Makira project in Madagascar, 246 and the Madre de
Dios Amazon REDD Project in Peru. 247
243F

24F

245F

246F

247F

_Aceh/Day_1_2/Papua%20Presentation%20(May%2018%202010).pdf (describing
REDD activities in Papua).
243 See GCF, supra note 197 (describing GCF).
244 See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 14 (describing the Ulu Masen project);
GOV’T OF ACEH, REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION IN THE ULU
MASEN ECOSYSTEM, ACEH, INDONESIA (2007), available at http://www
.climatestandards.org/projects/files/Final_Ulu_Masen_CCBA_project_design_no
te_Dec29.pdf (summarizing key features of Ulu Masen project).
245 See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 239, at 7-1 to 7-7 (describing
the Xingu carbon project in Brazil).
246 See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL & THE
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND
DEGRADATION (REDD): A CASEBOOK OF ON-THE-GROUND EXPERIENCE 10, 27–29, 37–
38 (2010) (discussing the Makira project in Madagascar).
247 See GREENOXX, MADRE DE DIOS AMAZON REDD PROJECT (2009), available at
http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/files/madre_peru/Madre_de_Dios
_Amazon_REDD_Project_REVISED.pdf (outlining the features of the Madre de
Dios Amazon REDD project); see also WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CTR., AN OVERVIEW
OF READINESS FOR REDD: A COMPILATION OF READINESS ACTIVITIES PREPARED ON
BEHALF OF THE FORUM ON READINESS FOR REDD (Tracy Johns et al. eds., 2009),
available at www.cbd.int/forest/doc/overview-readiness-redd.pdf (compiling
information on various REDD activities and projects around the world).
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It is in these diverse and complicated places, and in the
connections that get forged between them, where the proverbial
rubber hits the road. Indeed, for all of the enthusiasm surrounding
REDD as a beacon of hope in the international climate
discussions, 248 it will succeed or fail based on what happens in
places far removed from the negotiating halls of the United
Nations. The challenge is perhaps best posed as a series of
questions: is it possible that one day local land-use decisions made
in these faraway places could collectively translate into provincial
or national level emissions reductions that could themselves be
translated through a host of mediating institutions and
technologies into “compliance grade” assets, which in turn could
flow up into various GHG compliance markets or some other type
of pay-for-performance scheme? And even if this is a realistic
possibility, will there be institutions and laws in place to ensure
that local communities participate on the basis of free prior
informed consent, to guarantee that their rights and interests are
protected, and to make sure that they get a fair shake in the
distribution of benefits? Put another way, is it possible to imagine
and build a set of enabling environments such that REDD can be
made meaningful and valuable, in whatever form, for the Adat
communities in Indonesia, 249 for the tribes in the Amazon, for
landless peasants and small landowners all over the tropics—but
also for large agricultural producers, forestry companies, NGOs,
remote sensing experts, merchant banks, and government
regulators? It all seems a bit bracing when put in these terms. But
these are the terms of engagement if REDD is ever going to be
more than a noble experiment.
248F

249F

248 See Bryan Walsh, In Copenhagen’s Dark Mood, a Ray of Light for Forests, TIME,
Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article
/0,28804,1929071_1929070_1948263,00.html (stating that despite “the gloomy
atmosphere in Copenhagen,” REDD has been a sign of hope).
249 Masyarakat Adat literally means “people who adhere to customary
ways,” and has been variously translated to mean “customary communities,”
“traditional communities,” or “indigenous peoples.” Tania Murray Li, Masyarakat
Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia’s Forest Zone, 35 MOD.
ASIAN STUD. 645, 645 (2001) (citing the formal definition of masyarakat adat as
“people who adhere to customary ways”); see DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 17–27
(discussing recognition of Adat communities’ rights regarding land tenure and
forest resources under Indonesian law).
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4.3. The Changing Natures of Forest Law
Which brings us to law. In addition to the potentially
significant changes in the organization of state capacities for forest
governance (at multiple levels), REDD is also driving efforts to
reform and revise laws governing forests, land use, and carbon
within many tropical forest countries. And while much of this is
being carried out in the context of REDD “readiness” and capacity
building efforts, framed most often as a project of legal
modernization, it is important to recognize, at a more general level,
the considerable challenge that REDD poses for traditional legal
conceptions of forests and their relationship to state sovereignty.
Forests, of course, have long had a special legal status in their
relationship to the sovereign and to state projects of various kinds.
The origins of the word itself are juridical, “referring to land that
had been placed off limits by a royal decree,” 250 most often for the
purposes of ensuring an adequate supply of wild game for the
royal hunt. 251 Given their special territorial status tied directly to
the crown, these early “forests” were governed by a special body of
forest law with its own “particularized legal bureaucracy” that was
wholly outside of the common law. 252
Notwithstanding this distinctive royal provenance, forest
classification and mapping have also been intimately connected to
the emergence of the modern state. 253 In early European states
such as Germany and France, for example, delineating the
boundaries of forests and classifying their ownership and
250F

251F

25F

253F

250

As Robert Harrison notes,

[a] ”forest,” then, was originally a juridical term referring to land that
had been placed off limits by a royal decree. . . . it could not be
cultivated, exploited, or encroached upon. It lay outside the public
domain, reserved for the king’s pleasure and recreation. In England it
also lay outside the common juridical sphere. Offenders were not
punishable by the common law but rather by a set of very specific ”forest
laws.”
ROBERT POGUE HARRISON, FORESTS: THE SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION 69 (1992).
251 See id. at 69–70 (noting that forests were reserved for the enjoyment of the
king).
252 Id. at 73 (describing early forest law enforcement and the “particularlized
legal bureaucracy” of game wardens, forest sheriffs, and others especially
appointed by the crown).
253 See Nancy Lee Peluso, Whose Woods are These? Counter-Mapping Forest
Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia, 27 ANTIPODE 383, 383 (1995) (“Mapping of
forest resources is therefore an intrinsically political act: whether drawn for their
protection or production, they are drawings of a nation’s strategic space.”).
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production were central to the larger enterprise of cadastral
mapping. 254 In colonial and post-colonial states, particularly in the
tropics, similar exercises have provided a way of extending
jurisdiction over unruly spaces, excluding and disciplining certain
populations, and defining natural resources as objects of state
management and control. 255 Forest law and forest mapping have
thus been bound up in very direct ways with state directed
processes of territorialization. 256
To be sure, the history of forest law is a massively complex
topic, given the layering and hybridization of multiple legal and
normative orders across and within different jurisdictions. 257 And
it is well beyond the scope of this Article to attempt any sort of
systematic treatment of the subject. But at the risk of overgeneralization, it is clear that in many large tropical forest
countries, official forest law has often been highly centralized at
the national level, with the formal legal status of forests tied very
directly to national identity and basic understandings of
sovereignty. 258 Making forests part of “state space,” in other
words, has long been a key objective of forest law. 259
254F

25F

256F

257F

258F

259F

254 See, e.g., ROGER J.P. KAIN & ELIZABETH BAIGENT, THE CADASTRAL MAP IN THE
SERVICE OF THE STATE: A HISTORY OF PROPERTY MAPPING 132 (1992) (“Forest maps
are thus an important category of early state maps. Initially concentration was on
delineation of boundaries and codification of the rights of the monarch, the
nobility, and the peasantry to ownership or use of the forest.”).
255 See NANCY LEE PELUSO, RICH FORESTS, POOR PEOPLE: RESOURCE CONTROL
AND RESISTANCE IN JAVA (1992) (tracing efforts to extend state control over forests
in Java); S. RAVI RAJAN, MODERNIZING NATURE: FORESTRY AND IMPERIAL ECODEVELOPMENT 1800-1950, at 55 (2006) (“By the end of the nineteenth century . . .
[w]here there had once been state-sponsored forest destruction, there were now
extensive state-sponsored regimes of scientific resource management.”); Peter
Vandergeest & Nancy Lee Peluso, Territorialization and State Power in Thailand, 24
THEORY & SOC’Y 385, 391 (1995) (tracing the ways in which the classification and
demarcation of major portions of national territory as “forest,” enhanced state
control by extending state jurisdiction over such territory).
256 See discussion supra Section 2.2.
257 See Merry, supra note 186, at 876 (reviewing basic strands of legal
pluralism and their importance in understanding law and legal order in the
context of globalization); Nancy Lee Peluso & Peter Vandergeest, Genealogies of the
Political Forest and Customary Rights in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, 60 J. ASIAN
STUDIES 761 (2001) (discussing plural normative orders that helped create state
dominated “political” forests and “customary rights” in Southeast Asia).
258 See Peluso & Vandergeest, supra note 257 (discussing the construction of
the “political forest” as central to the larger project of establishing national
identity).
259 See JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST
HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 10–11 (2009) (discussing strategies of bringing
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Thus, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution states that “[t]he Brazilian
Amazonian forest . . . [is] part of national patrimony . . . .” 260 The
Brazilian Forestry Code echoes this, providing that the
conservation and management of all forests, public and private, are
under the jurisdiction of the federal government. 261
The
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 and the 1999 Forest Law, which
revised and replaced the Basic Forest Law of 1967 after the fall of
Suharto, provide that the vast majority of Indonesia’s forests are
“state forests” owned and controlled by the central government for
the benefit of the nation. 262 In other tropical forest countries, from
Guyana to Cameroon to Thailand to Costa Rica, the bulk of the socalled forest estate is similarly controlled by the national
government. 263
Many aspects of forest law in tropical countries, of course,
complicate this picture. The whole question of customary rights in
Indonesia, 264 the special status of indigenous territories in Brazil
and other South American countries, 265 and the substantial role of
260F

261F

26F

263F

264F

265F

forests and other formerly “ungoverned regions” into the ambit of state control);
PELUSO, supra note 255, at 353 (discussing centrality of forest mapping for defining
a “nation’s strategic space”).
260 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225, ¶ 4 (1985) (Braz.),
available at http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/titleVIII.html.
261 See Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de Setembro de 1965, C. FLOR. art. 1 (Brazil)
(extending federal jurisdiction over public and private forests for the common
interests of all inhabitants of the country).
262 See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 21–27 (summarizing the evolution of
Forestry Law in Indonesia and the dominance of the central government in
controlling forest access and use).
263 See IUCN, supra note 225 (providing an overview of REDD legal and
policy developments in several tropical forest countries, including Brazil,
Cameroon, Guyana, and Papua New Guinea); TAKACS, supra note 225 (explaining
legal and policy issues regarding REDD and forest carbon in Brazil, Costa Rica,
Indonesia, and Madagascar).
264 See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 23–25 (discussing specific provisions in
Indonesia’s 1999 Forestry Law affecting adat (customary) communities); Daniel
Fitzpatrick, Disputes and Pluralism in Modern Indonesian Land Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L.
L. 171, 173 (1997) (discussing conflict between legal reform under Indonesia’s
Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 and adat (customary) law); Li, supra note 249, at 657–
58 (describing ongoing efforts to define and secure recognition for customary
rights in Indonesia); Peluso & Vandergeest, supra note 257, at 766 (tracing histories
of how the construction of forests as objects of state management and control
established the basis for reinscribing certain customary practices of forest use as
“customary rights” and others as illegal activities).
265 See Anthony Stocks, Too Much for Too Few: Problems of Indigenous Land
Rights in Latin America, 34 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 85 (2005) (examining trends
and challenges associated with indigenous land rights in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia,
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community ownership in Papua New Guinea 266 (not to mention
the challenge of forest governance in weak or failed states in
central Africa) 267 all raise questions about the extent of state control
in certain circumstances.
Moreover, extensive efforts to
decentralize forest management throughout the developing world
since the 1980s have provided many local communities with
considerable autonomy over the management of forests. 268
Irrespective of these differences, however, the concept of
forests as national patrimony continues to structure the underlying
legal status of forests throughout the tropical world and beyond
and has come to define the basic approach to forests under
international law. Indeed, although forests—and tropical forests in
particular—have long been an object of international concern, they
have never had any sort of international legal status comparable to
that of “common heritage” or “common concern” resources. 269
Rather, forests have been treated in accordance with the long26F

267F

268F

269F

Colombia, and Nicaragua). Very little research to date has focused on the
question of indigenous rights to carbon. In Brazil, for example, three such
analyses have been conducted and the Brazilian government agency responsible
for indigenous territories (FUNAI) has issued a concept note in response to
requests from indigenous peoples seeking clarification regarding rights to carbon
and legal frameworks governing REDD activities in indigenous territories. In
general, these legal analyses conclude that indigenous communities have the legal
autonomy to sign contracts to engage in REDD and other forest carbon activities
subject to the Brazilian Constitution and existing international conventions to
which Brazil is a party and which seek to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.
See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 239, at 8-1 to 8-5 (summarizing
existing legal analyses on indigenous carbon rights in Brazil).
266 See IUCN, supra note 225, at 169–79 (discussing community land rights
and REDD in Papua New Guinea).
267 See Simon Counsell, Forest Governance in Africa (S. Afr. Inst. of Int’l Aff.,
Occ. Paper No. 50, 2009) (discussing challenges of forest governance in various
African countries).
268 See Agrawal et al., supra note 202 (discussing decentralization of forest
governance over past several decades); Andersson, supra note 236 (analyzing how
local institutional arrangements shape outcomes in the increasingly decentralized
policy regimes of the non-industrialized world); Hayes & Persha, supra note 202
(reviewing extensive research on forest governance decentralization and arguing
for the importance of decentralized forest governance structures for the success of
REDD+ initiatives); Jacob Phelps et al., Does REDD+ Threaten to Recentralize Forest
Governance?, 328 SCI. 312 (2010) (raising concerns about the possibility that
REDD+ could reverse trends toward decentralization of forest governance).
269 See PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 547
(2d ed. 2003) (“[T]ropical and other forests are not the ‘common heritage of
mankind’ under international law, and were not identified as a ‘common concern’
to mankind in the forest principles.”).
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standing principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources as recognized in various United Nations resolutions and
instruments. 270 Based on this principle, tropical forest countries
have heretofore consistently rejected efforts to “internationalize”
forest resources under various multilateral environmental
initiatives. 271
REDD, and the larger effort to bring forests into climate policy,
challenges all of this in various ways. At the most general level,
the conception of forests as key components of the global carbon
cycle (and the recognition that deforestation is a major source of
anthropogenic CO2 emissions) pushes hard against the notion that
forests are “natural resources” subject to the principle of
permanent sovereignty. Rather, forests, or more specifically the
services they provide (or are prevented from providing through
deforestation) start to look much more like global public goods,
given that the climate benefits that stem from protecting forests are
both non-rival and non-excludable within and across
generations. 272 Of course, these arguments have been made before,
in the biodiversity context for example, with no real impact on the
treatment of forests under international law, 273 and it seems
unlikely that REDD will change this in any formal way—at least in
the near term.
270F

271F

27F

273F

270 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., para. 4, art. 3 opened for
signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993)
[hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity] (reaffirming principle of
sovereignty over natural resources); Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), pmbl., para. 4, U.N., 17th Sess., Supp.
No. 17, U.N. Doc A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962) (referring to the “inalienable right of all
states to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with
their national interests”); Stockholm Declaration, supra note 106, princ. 21 (stating
that states have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies” [subject to a] “responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.”).
271 SANDS, supra note 269, at 546 (“Attempts by developed countries to
‘internationalize’ forest issues have so far been unsuccessful in legal terms, and
the tropical forest resources of developing countries are carefully guarded as part
of the national patrimony of these countries.”).
272 See Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2, 3–12 (Inge Kaul et al. eds.,
1999) (defining salient features of global public goods).
273 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 270, pmbl., para. 4, art.
3 (reaffirming principle of sovereignty over natural resources).
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But the very premise of REDD—putting an economic value on
standing forests that derives from their functional role in the global
carbon cycle—exerts considerable pressure on existing legal
conceptions of forests by inserting them into new value regimes
that are potentially global in scope.
By quantifying and
monetizing forest carbon in a manner that allows it to circulate
globally, a functioning REDD system will increase the value of
standing forests. These new value regimes will in turn usher in
new rights and obligations (and new contests over such rights and
obligations), begging for a rationalization of existing laws and
practices governing forests, land use, and carbon.
This process is already underway in a number of tropical forest
countries. 274 Indonesia, for example, enacted the world’s first
national-level REDD regulations in 2009. 275 Operating within the
context of Indonesia’s existing forest laws, these regulations
expressly contemplate linkage with an international REDD
mechanism, and empower the Ministry of Forestry to identify
eligible lands for REDD activities, establish requirements and
procedures for REDD projects, and create a licensing scheme to
verify the effectiveness of carbon storage and distribute carbon
credits. 276 Several Indonesian provinces, including two, Aceh and
Papua, that have special autonomy agreements with the central
government, have also enacted their own REDD-related laws and
programs. 277 And in Adat (customary) communities throughout
274F

275F

276F

27F

274 See IUCN, supra note 225 (discussing REDD-related legal developments in
several countries); TAKACS, supra note 225 (discussing legal developments
regarding carbon property rights in the forest sector).
275 See Tata Cara Pengurangan Emisi Dari Deforestasi Dan Degradasi Hutan
(REDD) [Implementation Procedures of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation], No. P.30/Menhut-II/2009 (2009) (Indon.) (defining the
procedures for application, assessment, approval and duration of REDD activities,
and specifying rights and obligations of the parties involved); Tata Cara Perizinan
Usaha Pemenfaatan Penyerapan Dan/Atau Penyimpanan Karbon Pada Hutan
Produksi Dan Hutan Lindung [Procedures for Licensing of Commercial
Utilisation of Carbon Sequestration and/or Storage in Production and Protected
Forests], No. P.36/Menhut-II/2009 (2009) (Indon.) (defining the licensing
procedures for commercial utilization of carbon sequestration and/or storage in
production and protected forests).
276 See sources cited supra note 275.
277 As part of the peace agreement with the Indonesian central government
following the 2004 tsunami, Aceh operates under a special autonomy law that
authorizes the government of Aceh to plan, manage, use and exploit “natural
resources in the province . . . including minerals, geothermal energy, forests,
agriculture, fisheries and sea resources.” There is also a special clause in the law
that re-affirms provincial control over the 2 million plus hectare Leuser
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Indonesia, community leaders and their advocates are raising
questions regarding how these emerging REDD programs will
impact customary rights and practices with respect to forests. 278
Brazil, which vigorously opposed the inclusion of avoided
deforestation under the Kyoto Protocol on sovereignty grounds,
amended its national forest law in 2006 to clarify government
ownership of carbon rights on public concessions, 279 and passed
legislation in 2009 intended to simplify the land titling process and
allow certain current occupants to gain legal title. 280 The Brazilian
Congress is also contemplating legislation that would establish a
national system for REDD. 281 As noted above, moreover, several
Brazilian states are developing sub-national legal and policy
frameworks for REDD. 282 And indigenous peoples and their
advocates are seeking clarity on carbon rights in the context of
Brazil’s existing laws regarding indigenous reserves. 283
Many issues have yet to be resolved by these nascent legal
developments, and it is impossible to predict how these various
278F

279F

280F

281F

28F

283F

ecosystem. In 2007, Aceh’s first democratically elected Governor and former
member of the Free Aceh Movement, Irwandi Yusuf, declared a moratorium on
logging in the province and created a special Green Economic Development and
Investment Strategy, known as Aceh Green, that focused on conserving the more
than 3 million hectares of primary tropical forests in the province through REDD
financing. In pursuit of these goals, the Aceh government has entered into
agreements with NGOs and the private sector to establish two very large REDD
projects covering most of the province. See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 11–16
(describing REDD initiatives in Aceh).
278 See, e.g., id. at 28–51 (describing community issues associated with REDD
activities in Aceh and Indonesia more generally).
279 See Decreto No. 11.284, de 2 de Março de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÁO
[D.O.U.] de 3.3.2006, art. 16, ¶ 1 (Braz.) (clarifying carbon rights with respect to
forest concessions on public land).
280 See Reese Ewing, Lula Signs Land Law Aimed at Reforming Amazon, REUTERS,
June
26,
2009,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article
/idUSTRE55P62M20090626 (discussing Brazilian law aimed at clarifying land
tenure).
281 See Comissão de Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sustentável –
Relatório, Projeto De Lei No 5.586, de 10 de Novembro de 2009 (proposing a
national REDD+ system for Brazil).
282 See Lei sobre Mudanças Climáticas, supra note 237 (identifying REDD as
part of climate change legislation in the state of Amazonas); Do Sistema Estadual
De Incentivos A Serviços Ambientais, supra note 238 (establishing REDD as
centerpiece of a comprhensive state law for environmental services in the state of
Acre).
283 See, e.g., Memorandum from Rodrigo Sales et al. to The Katoomba Group
(Nov. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing issues regarding legal title to
forest carbon as part of Suruí carbon project in Brazil).
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law reform efforts will proceed in particular jurisdictions. Among
the more prominent issues in need of resolution are those
pertaining to the new entitlement lines that REDD could create and
the implications of this for existing structures of forest governance.
As REDD credits are sold into GHG compliance systems or
recognized in other pay-for-performance schemes, new obligations
are created to maintain sufficient forest carbon stocks (that is, to
prevent the carbon embodied in tropical forests from leaking into
the atmosphere) in order to ensure the permanence of the credited
reductions, and, thus, make sure that the atmosphere, along with
the buyer and the compliance system to which the credits are
tendered, is made whole. 284 If and when REDD goes to scale, one
potential result is that large areas of tropical forests could become
encumbered with something akin to long-term servitudes. The
implications of such a development for those who live in and near
the forest could be quite significant, raising questions about who
will have the obligation to ensure that forest carbon stocks are
protected; who will bear the residual liability for so-called reversal
risks (that is, the situation where previously credited emissions
reductions are negated by future actions); who should have access
to the revenues from avoided emissions; and what will happen to
customary practices of forest use. 285
Related to these issues are a host of unresolved questions
regarding who actually owns (or should own) the carbon
embodied in standing forests and how the revenues from a REDD
system, which could be premised on payment for avoided
emissions from reduced deforestation, would be translated into
carbon benefits and distributed to local communities and other
stakeholders. Indeed, the whole question of carbon ownership gets
very complicated in the context of customary rights, indigenous
reserves, and other forms of community ownership and use of
284F

285F

284 See Michael Dutschke & Arild Angelsen, How Do We Ensure Permanence
and Assign Liability?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS 77–85 (Arild Angelsen ed., 2008) (discussing various approaches to
permanence in the context of REDD).
285 See Boyd, supra note 40, at 891–98 (discussing permanence and related
liability issues regarding REDD). It is worth remembering in this context that
there is a long history of criminalization of customary forest uses throughout the
world as part of larger state-directed efforts to control forest resources. See, e.g.,
PELUSO, supra note 255, at 8–17 (discussing the criminalization of traditional
practices of forest access and use); EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS:
THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975) (discussing the criminalization of customary
forest use in England during the 17th and 18th centuries).
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“state” forests. Efforts within Brazil and Indonesia to resolve these
questions are only just beginning, and there are very legitimate
concerns that in the absence of clarity on land and carbon rights,
REDD will drive a new land grab of sorts by governments and
other powerful actors, to the obvious detriment of local
communities. Some commentators see this as an important reason
to clarify and secure land tenure and carbon ownership in a
manner that protects the rights of local communities living in and
near the forest before proceeding with REDD. 286
Finally, because of the increased value that REDD would place
on standing forests, there are real concerns that without adequate
safeguards a REDD system will foster a re-centralization of forest
law and governance at the national level, a tendency that could be
reinforced by the preference for national-level approaches to
tracking deforestation and accounting for REDD under an
international program. 287 The new Indonesian REDD regulations
discussed above illustrate this by vesting authority in the Ministry
of Forestry. Furthermore, the Indonesian government has made
recent statements suggesting that sub-national entities will not be
allowed to proceed with certain REDD activities without
permission from Jakarta. As a country’s forests are inserted into a
REDD regime, in other words, the national government could
emerge as the default choice for taking on new responsibilities and
acquiring new authorities—but in a manner that is “denationalized” in the sense that these new responsibilities and
authorities are tied to a particular global project. Thus, REDD has
the potential to substantially bulk up the forest governance
capacities of national governments even while it is putting those
capacities in service to a global project. From a normative
286F

287F

286 See, e.g., LORENZO COTULA & JAMES MAYERS, TENURE IN REDD: START-POINT
AFTERTHOUGHT? (2009) (emphasizing the importance of considering local
forest-dependent communities and land tenure in REDD implementation);
Benjamin Blom et al., Getting REDD to Work Locally: Lessons Learned from Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects, 13 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 164 (2010)
(emphasizing importance of attending to rights and interests of local communities
in developing REDD programs); J. Phelps et al., What Makes a ‘REDD’ Country?, 20
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 322, 329 (2010) (“The Philippines case study helps
elucidate why governance, conservation priorities and rights frameworks should
feed into more comprehensive REDD planning and sub-national analyses.”).
287 See Phelps et al., supra note 268, at 312 (“By monetizing forest carbon,
REDD+ will substantially increase the market value of forests, including those
previously considered marginal, incentivizing central governments to increase
control.”).
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standpoint, such a development poses considerable risks to the
rights and interests of local communities because of the obvious
potential to exacerbate the pre-existing pathologies of various
rentier states across the tropical world—all of which puts a
premium on building into any REDD regime (at multiple sites)
legal protections and safeguards to allow such communities to
control the terms on which they engage with REDD. 288
28F

4.4. De-couplings
At the most basic level, REDD seeks to create a new global
form—forest carbon—that can be de-coupled from the physical
forest and allowed to circulate in global value chains. In creating
this novel asset class with potentially global reach, REDD thus
establishes new circumstances under which land and forests
acquire value, 289 thereby creating new demands for resources,
capabilities, laws, institutions, and expertise in order to realize
these value forms and embed them in new entitlement structures
and frameworks of authority. In the process, tropical forests, and
the many people who depend upon them, are being pulled into
emerging transnational regulatory systems, with substantial
implications for existing structures of forest law and governance
and, more generally, the relationship of the state to the forest, to
conceptions of national territory, and to the multitude of local
communities and other forest-dependent peoples. By de-coupling
forest carbon from the forest ecosystem, REDD de-couples territory
and accountability from their traditional instantiations in the state.
Understanding what is gained and what is lost in this process with
respect to existing practices of forest use and governance will
289F

288 The World Bank estimates that some 60 million indigenous people are
totally dependent on forests. In addition, about 350 million people are considered
highly forest dependent, and 1.2 billion people are dependent on agro-forestry for
some part of their livelihoods. IUCN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND REDD-PLUS:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN REDD-PLUS 2 n.2 (June 2010).
289 As Katherine Verdery notes,

my subject here is the circumstances under which land acquires value—
and value of what kind and for whom. What forces come together, and
how, to shape the value that land holds, so that people want to
manipulate it, invoke it, own it, belong to it, identify with it? What kinds
of resources need they have in order to realize the value they attribute to
that object?
KATHERINE VERDERY, THE VANISHING HECTARE: PROPERTY
POSTSOCIALIST TRANSYLVANIA 21 (2003).
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require moving beyond the predominantly technical focus on
carbon accounting and MRV that dominates much of the
contemporary REDD policy discussion.
To that effect, the technical forms that are underwriting REDD
can be seen as part of the larger effort to harness national territories
and key elements of those territories (namely, the ability of tropical
forests to store carbon) to a global project aimed at managing the
Earth’s carbon cycle and stabilizing the composition of the
atmosphere. In the process, local and provincial-level structures of
forest governance are (re)combining with national and
transnational capabilities to create technical, legal, and institutional
frameworks for generating compliance grade assets and moving
them into GHG compliance systems and other pay-forperformance schemes. At the most general level, REDD thus
embodies a distinctive territorial project that derives from new
global forms of calculability and legibility that are in turn
facilitating the processes of unbundling and de-nationalization
discussed previously. The state emerges in all of this as a key
mediating institution necessary to make REDD cohere as a nested,
polycentric form of governance. 290
Supporters of REDD have tended to view the prospects of these
developments in a positive light, celebrating the potential of
remote sensing technologies to produce new forms of information
about tropical forests (and their embodied carbon) that are
objective, transparent, open-access, largely free, and auditable; 291
embracing carbon finance (public and private) as a means of
putting an economic value on standing tropical forests on a scale
not possible under previous conservation efforts; 292 and promoting
290F

291F

29F

290

Understanding the role of the state in this context thus requires

a shift away from looking at the state first and foremost as a leviathan
machine, a set-apart sphere of command and decision, to looking at it
against the background of the sort of society in which it is embedded—
the confusion that surrounds it, the confusion it confronts, the confusion
it causes, the confusion it responds to.
Clifford Geertz, What Is a State If It Is Not a Sovereign? Reflections on Politics in
Complicated Places, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 577, 580 (2004).
291 See, e.g., JOHAN ELIASCH, CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCING GLOBAL FORESTS:
THE ELIASCH REVIEW 145 (2008) (“Satellite images of changing forest cover provide
a greater degree of transparency in monitoring forest emissions reductions than
monitoring in other sectors.”).
292 See, e.g., Better REDD than Dead: Tropical Forests’ Best Hope,, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 25, 2010, at 8–9 (discussing potential of REDD to tap into large-scale carbon
finance).
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the seemingly inevitable rationalization of forest law and
governance (framed in terms of clarity of land tenure and creation
of new carbon rights) as key elements of a pathway to a new
paradigm of forest governance. 293
As a global project built upon these new forms of calculability,
value, and ownership, therefore, one might argue, along with
advocates of new governance, that REDD will create new
opportunities to reform notoriously corrupt forest sector practices
in many tropical forest countries 294 by inserting them into new
transnational networks of responsibility.
GHG compliance
markets, along with the prospect of performance-based public
finance, in this view, provide a means for leveraging improved
forest governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability. 295 Realizing such an optimistic view of REDD’s
potential, of course, is by no means assured, and even if it does
come to pass it will be important to understand what is gained and
what is lost in the process of inserting tropical forests and the
people who live in them into larger transnational systems of value
and regulation.
Nowhere is this more apparent than with respect to the rights
and interests of local forest-dependent people. To date, various
civil society and stakeholder groups have been working at multiple
levels to ensure that social safeguards regarding informed consent,
participation, and protection of rights and interests of forestdependent people are being incorporated into some of the key sites
293F

294F

295F

293 See, e.g., Arild Angelsen & Stibniati Atmadja, What is this Book About?, in
MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 284, at 1
(describing potential for REDD as a “win-win” strategy of reducing GHG
emissions “because the potentially large financial transfers and better governance
can benefit the poor in developing countries and provide other environmental
gains on top of the climate-related benefits.”).
294 See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, SUSTAINING FORESTS: A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
31–32 (2004) (discussing poor governance and corruption in the forest sector).
295 These efforts recognize that California, the United States, and other
jurisdictions contemplating provisions recognizing REDD in their own GHG
compliance systems could exercise leverage akin to that enjoyed by large retailers
over the environmental performance of global supply chains—what Michael P.
Vandenberg calls “the new Wal-Mart effect.” See Michael P. Vandenberg, The
New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 913, 918 (2007) (“The New Wal-Mart effect occurs when a mix of social,
economic, and legal factors induces a firm to impose on its suppliers private
environmental or other requirements that are traditionally the subject of
government regulations.”).
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where REDD is taking shape. A key component of their strategy is
to insert what might be called “accountability forcing” obligations
or requirements into the design of provisions that would accept
REDD credits in emerging GHG compliance systems. Thus,
advocates for local forest-dependent communities and indigenous
peoples are working in the U.N. process and the U.S. policy
debates to embed the principle of free prior informed consent,
strong protections for indigenous peoples’ rights and interests, and
specific benefit sharing requirements for local forest-dependent
communities in the eligibility criteria for bringing REDD credits
into these compliance markets. 296 In effect, the commodity itself
becomes a point of leverage, its compliance-grade status
contingent upon assurances that rights and interests of local people
are protected in faraway places. Operationalizing this, of course, is
exceedingly difficult. How, for example, will EPA or the California
Air Resources Board (or other future regulators in charge of
administering other GHG compliance systems) ensure that REDD
credits come from activities that meet minimum social safeguards?
What kinds of MRV will be necessary to provide such assurances?
Who will monitor the monitors?
What role, again, will
governments in tropical forest countries play in all of this? How
can this be done in a manner that does not impose massive
transactions costs on the whole effort? These are the questions that
will have to be answered if REDD is going to deliver in a manner
that protects not only climate and topical forests but also the rights,
interests, and livelihoods of forest-dependent people.
296F

296 Efforts under the UNFCCC to negotiate a REDD+ mechanism have been
proceeding under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Commitments under
the Convention (“AWG-LCA”). The recently adopted Cancún Agreement
represents the outcome of the AWG-LCA work, and includes specific provisions
regarding safeguards for indigenous and forest-dependent peoples in the context
of REDD+. See Cancún Agreement, supra note 24, para. 69 & Annex I, paras. 2(c)–
(d) (calling upon Parties to promote and support specific safeguards when
undertaking REDD+ activities including “full and effective participation” and
“{r]espect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of
local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations,
national circumstances and laws, and noting that the General Assembly has
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”).
REDD provisions in proposed federal climate legislation in the United States also
include specific safeguards regarding rights and interests of indigenous and
forest-dependent peoples. See, e.g., ACES, supra note 198, § 743(e)(1)(E) (requiring
that REDD offsets come from activities that give due regard to the rights and
interests of indigenous and other local communities, are based upon robust
stakeholder participation, and result in equitable sharing of benefits).
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All of which may well turn out to represent an overly
optimistic, even naïve, view of the possibilities that could come
with a fully functioning REDD regime. 297 As with any multifaceted enterprise aimed at large-scale social change, there are
many conflicting rationalizations and arguments for and against
REDD; many reasons to doubt its prospects. And there is little
question that if REDD goes to scale, something important will be
lost as some the last non-administered spaces on Earth are
engulfed by this global project—a final “stage[] in the
subordination of the surface of the planet to the needs of an
industrial society.” 298 Needless to say, the alternative—ongoing
destruction of the world’s tropical forests with substantial
additional carbon loading to the atmosphere—is surely much
worse, highlighting once again the reality of triage and tragic
choices that marks virtually all of climate policy. If anything, then,
the REDD experience, still very much a work in progress, suggests
that the road ahead will be much messier and much more
complicated than advocates of top-down approaches to climate
governance ever imagined.
297F

298F

5.

CONCLUSION

In an influential 1970 essay, The Search for Paradigms as a
Hindrance to Understanding, Albert Hirschman warned against
seeking blueprints and grand strategies as roadmaps for “largescale social change.” 299 The best that we can do, according to
29F

297 Such possibilities resonate with the optimistic view of global governance
and accountability embraced by scholars of new governance and global
administrative law. As Joshua Cohn and Charles Sabel suggest,

[t]he emergence of global politics is marked by a proliferation of political
settings beyond domestic boundaries. This proliferation expands the
range of relevant political actors, while shifting our understanding of
political units and of relations among them: the emergence of human
rights as limits on Westphalian sovereignty was a first step in this shift,
but not the last.
Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy? 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
763, 763 (2005). See also Kingsbury et al., supra note 144, at 17 (discussing
application of principles of administrative law to global governance).
298 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 179 (Beacon Press 1957) (1944); see also SCOTT, supra note 259,
at 4–9 (discussing the “last enclosure” of various non-state spaces around the
world).
299 Albert O. Hirschman, The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to
Understanding, 22 WORLD POL. 329, 343 (1970).
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Hirschman, is to learn from experience and to have a “passion for
what is possible.” 300 As Hirschman and many others before and
after recognized, the historical record is littered with various failed
schemes to improve the human condition. 301 Indeed, if two
generations of social research on the challenges of development
have taught us anything it is that there is no one right way, no
single recipe or algorithm that will, if followed, lead to economic
growth, much less political stability, social order, rule of law, or
any other desired outcome of social change.
And yet, climate policy seems to have missed these basic
lessons. Seized by the conviction that there can and should be a
blueprint for comprehensive climate governance, manifest most
prominently in the Kyoto architecture and in the efforts to
negotiate a successor treaty, the climate regime has stumbled
through a series of disappointments, marked most recently by the
dramatic failure to adopt a new treaty at the 2009 U.N. Climate
Conference in Copenhagen and by the limited, non-binding
workplan adopted at the 2010 climate meeting in Cancún. This
Article has argued that the difficulties facing international climate
policy stem from an unrealistic embrace of top-down, global
approaches to the problem and a corresponding lack of attention to
the realities of a plural, fragmented international legal and political
order. This posture of “globalism,” which derives in part from a
distinctive set of knowledge practices that has sought to make the
Earth system into a unitary, governable domain, has pushed
international climate policy into what appears to be an intractable
political impasse regarding the prospects of fashioning a binding
legal instrument capable of coordinating an effective global
response to the problem.
To be sure, an alternative approach to climate governance that
is more sensitive to the facts of globalization, pluralism, and
fragmentation at multiple levels of authority cannot simply
devolve into a naïve celebration of localism or, even worse, a
fatalism that acknowledges the enormous complexity of it all,
recognizes that the clock has run in terms of any possibility of
achieving prudent stabilization targets, and urges that all
remaining resources and attention be shifted to adaptation or, in
more extreme cases, geoengineering. The “solutions” to climate
30F

301F

Id.
See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 45 (documenting various failed schemes to
improve the human condition).
300
301
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change, if they can even called that, will be as varied and
complicated as the problem itself, assembled through many new
connections across and within levels of governance, implicating a
vast array of actors, institutions, laws, and values. Understanding
how these varied and partial solutions are emerging thus becomes
a critical component of the larger effort to learn from experience
and expand the conditions of possibility for effective forms of
climate governance.
Viewed from this perspective, post-Copenhagen climate
governance looks much more like the messy, multi-layered forms
of governance emerging in response to other global threats such as
terrorism, financial crisis, or infectious disease—forms of
governance marked not by a single, overarching regulatory system
but a complex, nested set of institutions and actors. Wrapped up
in all of this is a recognition that conventional regulatory structures
associated with traditional notions of government cannot combat
these problems effectively without tapping into a much broader
and more fluid set of practices that spans multiple geographies and
publics. Confronted by a set of problems arising out of the
exceedingly complex interplay of social, economic, and ecological
systems and faced with an increasingly tenuous sphere of
competence, the contemporary state appears as only one element
(albeit a critical one) in a broader emerging assemblage of actors,
institutions, and knowledge practices. By taking these emerging
assemblages on their own terms, by viewing them as partial,
contingent forms of governance, and by seeking to understand
how they hold together (or not) we can gain insight into the
possibilities and the challenges of building enabling environments
that can harness ongoing efforts and direct them toward realistic
forms of climate governance.
The REDD case provides one example of how a particular form
of climate governance is taking shape at multiple levels in many
faraway places all over the world, illustrating just how messy,
complicated, and contingent climate governance is once we look
beneath the international process. Indeed, the complex, partial,
emergent nature of REDD demonstrates clearly that if this is
pursued in a singular, top-down fashion that ignores the
vernacular institutions of national and sub-national formations it
will surely fail. In order for nested, polycentric forms of climate
governance to work, they will have to be assembled from above
and below, with careful attention to who wins and who loses,
careful attention to the tactical opportunities that emerge to
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influence the assemblage in ways that enhance meaningful
participation across and within the different nested levels. The
project of global environmental law, if it is ever going to be more
than a catch-all for the varied and variable forms of transnational
environmental governance taking shape in multiple domains, will
need to engage with all of this in much more direct fashion, which
means getting out and working in these diverse and complicated
places, getting out and understanding how global projects are
being worked out in concrete institutional settings all over the
world.
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